9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
130.
Under the
heading “security transition”, Mr Blair wrote that the problem
was:
“… if we
look as if we’re wanting to go, that undermines our resolve; if we
look as if
we’re
wanting to stay, that undermines our political strategy to help
Iraq stand on its
own feet as
a democracy.”
131.
The solution,
he suggested, was an Iraqi-led transition plan before the
elections,
setting out
“how we intend to proceed”, with a media strategy for its
communication.
132.
On
organisation, Mr Blair stressed the need for effective
political engagement and
suggested
that he and President Bush should receive a regular report from
Mr Patey
and
Ambassador Khalilzad “specifically on the political
outreach”.
133.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush on 5 August and suggested that an
informal
contact
group was needed to take forward a conference to bring Sunni and
Shia groups
together.62
Mr Blair
considered that the key was “to draw in the silent Sunni majority”
and
suggested
that the UK and US Ambassadors should report progress on a weekly
basis.
134.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported a last-ditch attempt by key Iraqi
politicians
to achieve
consensus on the Constitution on the eve of 15
August.63
Discussion
of the
draft text
continued into the night. The Embassy judged that a short extension
to the
drafting
deadline was the most likely outcome.
135.
Negotiations
continued on 15 August, focused on the proposed process
for
achieving
federal autonomy, and on natural resources.64
Half an
hour before the expiry
of the
deadline (at midnight) the Speaker of the TNA proposed an amendment
to
the TAL extending
the drafting deadline to 22 August, which was passed
unanimously
by the
TNA.
136.
Following a
visit to Iraq from 13 to 18 August, Mr Asquith commented that
the
constitutional
negotiations had “exposed the crystalline brittleness of the
political
process”.65
In his
view, the Shia Islamist and Kurdish leaders had:
“… always
known that they could achieve a Constitution (text and sufficient
votes in
a
referendum) over the wishes of the Sunni, by trading with each
other Islamist and
federal
language that satisfied their respective key
objectives.”
137.
Mr Asquith
noted that both had, so far, pulled back from such a “bilateral
stitch-up”.
That was in
his view significant, and should help to encourage Sunni
participation in the
referendum
and elections, something which he considered of fundamental
importance.
62
Letter
Phillipson to Wilson, 5 August 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 5 August: Iraq,
Syria,
Iran, engaging mainstream Islam/tackling extremism’.
63
eGram
11208/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution: Hangs in the Balance’.
64
eGram
11265/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution: 7 More Days’.
65
Minute
Asquith to Howells, 22 August 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit 13-18 August
2005’.
511