6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
473.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 23 September that the international community
had
to be
committed to Iraq’s reconstruction.
474.
Cabinet met on
23 September (see Section 3.5). Points made in
discussion
included:
“… in the
event of military action, a clear vision was required of the
outcome we
wanted in
reconstructing Iraq: this would be a major task”.259
475.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said that a “crunch point” had been
reached:
“The
sanctions regime … was being eroded and Saddam Hussein was on the
way to
acquiring
new capability in weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had to comply
with the
obligations
placed on it by the United Nations. A tough line was required. If
military
action was
required, the job could be done. There would be a discussion about
the
military
options … civilian casualties should be kept to a minimum, but
there could
be no doubt
that the main beneficiaries of the removal of Saddam Hussein would
be
the Iraqi
people. Iraq was basically a wealthy country. The international
community
had to be
committed to Iraq’s reconstruction.”
476.
Mr Cook wrote
in his memoir that he closed his contribution:
“... by
stressing the vital importance of getting approval for anything we
do through
the UN.
‘What follows after Saddam will be the mother of all
nation-building
projects.
We shouldn’t attempt it on our own – if we want the rest of the
international
community
with us at the end, we need them in at the start.’”260
477.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Brown had made “a few long-term
points
for the US,
the need to think through post-Saddam, the importance of the
MEPP”.261
478.
Late on 23
September, Mr Brenton reported that the US Administration
was
“starting
to get to grips with ‘Day After’ questions – in [the] State
[Department]’s case,
with
considerable trepidation”.262
A senior
State Department official had suggested that
anything
other than an Iraqi General succeeding Saddam Hussein would be
extremely
challenging
and involve the US in a massive presence for an indefinite
period.
479.
Parliament
was recalled to discuss Iraq on 24 September. There
was
considerable
concern in both Houses about arrangements to support Iraq
after
an
invasion.
480.
Mr Blair
drew attention, in the context of Afghanistan, to the
UK’s
commitment
to “stick with” the Afghan people “until the job of reconstruction
is
259
Cabinet
Conclusions, 23 September 2002.
260
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK, 2003.
261
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
262
Telegram
1221 Washington to FCO London, 23 September 2002,
‘US/Iraq’.
191