3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
would be to
use the French demand for a further meeting in a month to ask for
another
report from
Dr Blix. It would also be important to leave time for an
initiative to persuade
Saddam to
leave. That would mean delaying the start of military action
until late March.
470.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that the US Administration
was disappointed
with Dr Blix’s less than categorical verdict on Iraqi
compliance.126
A White
House spokesman had downplayed the importance of the new avenues
of
co-operation
identified by Dr Blix. The meeting had made securing a second
resolution
more
difficult, but the Administration was determined to press
ahead.
471.
In the
light of the position in the Security Council and the
perception
that the
US would push for a vote by the end of February, FCO and
No.10
officials
proposed using the French proposal for a Ministerial
discussion
on 14 March
to provide a deadline for a report from the inspectors on
whether
Iraq was co‑operating.
472.
Mr Ricketts
wrote to Mr Straw on 15 February stating: “I know you want to
cogitate
over the
weekend about how we adjust strategy.” He set out the FCO’s
thinking “about
how we
might rally opinion in the Council through some version of an
ultimatum and
more time
to give it effect”.127
473.
Mr Ricketts
sent Mr Straw a minute from Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO
Director Middle
East and
North Africa, of 13 February and a minute from
Mr Stephen Pattison, FCO
Head of the
UN Department, which set out ways to make specific demands of
Iraq.
474.
Mr Chaplin
had written that it was:
“… probably
the last opportunity to reflect on whether we can extract … a
better
outcome …
than at present looks likely.
“The mood
in Washington points to early tabling of a second SCR and a quick
drive
to
adoption. At best this will secure 9-10 positive votes and 5-6
abstentions. There
is a
substantial risk … that the text will be vetoed, at which point the
US … will go
for military
action … I cannot imagine the Prime Minister then refusing to
follow.
“… No SCR
and a feeble, at best, legal basis for military action is a
nightmare
scenario.
The domestic consequences (and increased risk of terrorism to
British
citizens
and staff) are daunting enough for Ministers. But the … longer term
damage
to UK
interests would be more severe because longer lasting. The image of
the
UK, lone
ally […] of a rampant US in its assault on Iraq, will be the
touchstone for
Arab and
Muslim attitudes for a generation – this is the real Suez effect. A
quick
collapse of
the Iraqi regime (quite likely); subsequent clear proof, because
we
126
Telegram
209 Washington to FCO London, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Initial US
reactions
to the Blix/ElBaradei
Report’.
127
Minute
Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Rethinking Strategy’.
265