The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• There might be further indirect costs, including in relation to an increase in

people seeking asylum.

261. The officials summarised the “big numbers” in a table which is reproduced in

full below.

Table 3: The Treasury’s estimate of the direct cost of conflict, February 2003 (£bn)

Military costs – war and immediate aftermath

Military – RAB costs

Military – aftermath

Humanitarian aid

Reconstruction aid

ECGD

Total

2002/03

1.0

–

1.0

2003/04

1.5

0.1

0.5

0.1‑0.25

0.1‑0.5

?

2.3‑c3.0

2004/05

0.5

0.15

1.0

?

1.7+

2005/06

–

0.15

?

262. The officials advised that any DFID contribution to humanitarian and reconstruction

costs would be constrained by DFID’s commitment to spend 90 percent of its bilateral

resources in low‑income countries. Ms Short had already written to Mr Blair (on

5 February) asking for advice on the approach that DFID should take and the potential

for extra resources. It was “quite credible to imagine DFID putting [in] a bid for several

hundred million pounds”.

263. Mr Brown and Mr Boateng received a further update on military post‑conflict costs

from a Treasury official the following day.159 In that context, the official commented that

the Treasury would also need to take account of the costs of humanitarian assistance

and reconstruction:

“Our line to date has been that departments (mainly DFID) should meet these [costs]

through budget reprioritisation. We would welcome your steer on this but, based on

past conflicts, we suspect it is unlikely to be a sustainable line in the long term.”

264. The US inter-agency Rock Drill from 21 to 22 February confirmed the scale of the

shortcomings in US post‑conflict planning, including the deficiencies of the US Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the continuing gap between

UK and US positions on the role of the UN (see Section 6.5).

265. Ms Short held a meeting on Iraq with DFID officials, including Dr Brewer and

Mr Fernie, on 24 February.160 The meeting identified the “increased recognition across

159 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Potential Cost and

How Should We Present Them?’.

160 Minute Bewes to Miller, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning: Update’.

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