The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses:
•
the
evolution of the assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
capabilities
before Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford in
early
April 2002;
and
•
how the
information was used within Government and in public, including
the
preparation
between February and July 2002 of a document for
publication,
initially
on WMD programmes of concern in four countries and
subsequently
on Iraq.
2.
The
development of UK strategy on Iraq before the attacks on the US in
September
2001 is
addressed in Section 1.2; the development of UK strategy and
options after 9/11
is
addressed in Section 3.
3.
The
development of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments
of Iraq’s
WMD
programmes from late July onwards, and the resumption of work on
the dossier
after
Mr Blair’s press conference in Sedgefield on 3 September, are
addressed in
Section
4.2.
•
The ingrained
belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and
biological
warfare
capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance
its
capabilities,
including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and
was
pursuing an
active policy of deception and concealment, had underpinned UK
policy
towards
Iraq since the Gulf Conflict ended in 1991.
•
Iraq’s
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as
a threat
to
international peace and security in the Middle East, but overall,
the threat from
Iraq was
viewed as less serious than that from other key countries of
concern – Iran,
Libya and
North Korea.
•
The
Assessments issued by the JIC reflected the uncertainties within
the intelligence
community
about the detail of Iraq’s activities.
•
The statements
prepared for, and used by, the UK Government in public from
late
2001
onwards, conveyed more certainty than the JIC Assessments about
Iraq’s
proscribed
activities and the potential threat they posed.
•
The tendency
to refer in public statements only to Iraq’s “weapons of
mass
destruction”
was likely to have created the impression that Iraq posed a greater
threat
than the
detailed JIC Assessments would have supported.
•
There was
nothing in the JIC Assessments issued before July 2002 that
would
have raised
any questions in policy-makers’ minds about the core construct
of
Iraq’s
capabilities and intent. Indeed, from May 2001 onwards, the
perception
conveyed
was that Iraqi activity could have increased since the departure of
the
weapons
inspectors, funded by Iraq’s growing illicit income from
circumventing the
sanctions regime.
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