The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
846.
The two-year
timetable was a reference to the period covered by IRRF2,
which
Congress
had approved just over a week earlier.
847.
Sir Hilary
Synnott told the Inquiry that the whole idea of an early transfer
to a
transitional
Iraqi Government came as a surprise to him:
“In the
middle of November, much to our surprise, and in many – well, in
some
senses
disappointment, it was decided that the CPA should wind up at the
end of
June, and I
was due to leave … [at] the end of January. It became clear to me
a
couple of
months before that that the entire focus of Baghdad’s attention had
shifted
from trying
to make something work into, ‘What are we going to do to run
down?’”478
848.
Mr Etherington
described the effect of the decision in Wasit:
“The
November 15 agreement abruptly turned [our] plans upside down. It
arrived
without
warning …
“… We
understood the political reasons behind it all, but my overwhelming
feeling
at the time
was of professional shame. Gone were our projections about
training
and
capacity-building, our carefully thought-through project work, and
our plans to
nurture
each of the Councils and steadily reform the branch ministries. We
would
849.
Mr Bearpark
told the Inquiry:
“… most
decisions were being made by default, what was possible and what
wasn’t
possible.
But to the extent that decisions were being taken, my view was that
they
didn’t look
particularly stupid and that some of the sillier parts of these
strategic
visions
were just being quietly forgotten about …
“I don’t
think that the truncated timetable was an issue. I think the real
issue was
just that,
by then, security was spiralling out of control … The only aspect
where the
truncation
had an impact … was that it reopened the battle between the
Department
of Defense
and the State Department, and … the final three months of the
CPA’s
existence
were just one permanent battleground as to who would handle
the
[US$]18.4bn,
and in what way, after the CPA was abolished.”480
850.
Ambassador
Bremer wrote in his memoir that he had discussed the implications
of
the new
timetable for reconstruction with senior CPA staff on 16 November,
the day after
the
announcement.481
He had
asked each CPA Senior Adviser to identify the most
urgent
tasks which
had to be completed before the transfer of sovereignty, and advised
them
478
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 47.
479
Etherington
M. Revolt of
the Tigris: The Al Sadr Uprising and the Governing of
Iraq. Hurst
& Company,
2006.
480
Public
hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 86-87.
481
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
146