The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
178.
Lt Gen McColl
did not consider Fallujah vital to the conduct of the
elections.
Rather, the
offensive risked “total Sunni disenfranchisement” and therefore
jeopardising
the
elections. He was also concerned about potential damage to the
cohesion of the
Interim
Government and about the resilience of the Iraqi security
forces.
179.
In preparation
for a visit to Iraq, the British Embassy Baghdad briefed Mr
Straw
that there
was “a lively debate, including between us and the Americans
locally, about
how and
when to deal with Fallujah”.94
The UK view
was cautious, “questioning whether
Fallujah
can be dealt with quickly and decisively and insisting that we
think through
carefully
the consequences of military action”.
180.
Visiting
Baghdad on 5 October, Mr Straw found Prime Minister Allawi
cautious
181.
Mr Straw
recommended to Mr Blair that the UK impress on the
Americans
“the need
for a thought through military plan, complemented by an Allawi-led
political
182.
Lt Gen Fry
provided the Chiefs of Staff with a paper for discussion at their
meeting
on 6
October which incorporated Lt Gen McColl’s analysis of 23
September.97
In
the
paper he
sought to define “an achievable and acceptable exit strategy for UK
forces
in Iraq”.
183.
Lt Gen Fry
recommended the first option set out by Lt Gen McColl and wrote
that
the MOD
“should initiate debate across Whitehall arguing that the UK’s
policy should
be for the
MNF-I to withdraw from Iraq in its
current form on expiry
of its current UN
mandate”.
He warned that failure to persuade the US to that view could leave
the UK
with “an
unpalatable choice between unilateral withdrawal or an enduring
commitment
that runs a
high risk of strategic failure and which would severely constrain
our strategic
aspirations
for N[ATO] R[esponse] F[orce] 6 and Afghanistan in
06”.
184.
The Chiefs of
Staff concluded that the review of the MNF-I’s UN mandate
in
mid‑2005
“could present a more appropriate opportunity for a wider review
with
MNF‑I Partners
avoiding pre-empting early coalition draw-down
decisions”.98
185.
Gen Walker
commissioned a submission for Mr Hoon to send Mr Blair
before
Lt Gen
Fry’s paper was taken further.
186.
Mr Straw
raised UK troop numbers with Mr Blair the following
day.99
Having
recently
returned from a visit to Iraq, he wrote:
94
Telegram
245, Baghdad to FCO London, 4 October 2004, ‘Your Visit to Iraq,
5-6 October: Scenesetter’.
95
Telegram
251 Baghdad to FCO, 6 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with Prime Minister,
5
October’.
96
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 7 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.
97
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS, 1 October 2004, ‘Iraq – Achieving Strategic
Overwatch of Iraqi Self-Reliance’.
98
Minutes, 6
October 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
99
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 7 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.
426