3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
between
Europe and the United States, the relations within the European
Union and
the way in
which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it
could
hardly be
more important. It will determine the pattern of international
politics for the
next
generation.”
899.
Mr Blair
rehearsed the Government’s position on Iraq’s past pursuit and use
of
weapons of
mass destruction; its failures to comply with the obligations
imposed by
the UN
Security Council between 1991 and 1998; Iraq’s repeated
declarations which
proved to
be false; and the “large quantities of weapons of mass destruction”
which
were
“unaccounted for”. He described UNSCOM’s final report (in January
1999) as
“a
withering indictment of Saddam’s lies, deception and obstruction”
in which “large
quantities
of weapons of mass destruction” were “unaccounted
for”.
900.
Addressing
Saddam Hussein’s claims that Iraq had no weapons of
mass
destruction,
Mr Blair stated that “after seven years of obstruction and
non-compliance”
before the
inspectors left in 1998, “we are asked to believe” he had
“voluntarily decided
to do what
he had consistently refused to do under coercion”. Mr Blair
also stated:
“We are
asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years – contrary
to all
history,
contrary to all intelligence – Saddam decided unilaterally to
destroy those
weapons. I
say that such a claim is palpably absurd.”
901.
Resolution
1441 required “full, unconditional and immediate compliance”. The
first
step was a
full and final declaration of all Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction. Mr Blair
stated that
he would not address the events that had taken place since the
declaration
“as the
House is familiar with them”, but “all members” of the Security
Council “accepted”
that the
Iraq declaration (of 7 December 2002) was false. That
was:
“… in
itself … a material breach. Iraq has taken some steps in
co-operation but no
one
disputes that it is not fully co-operating. Iraq continues to deny
that it has any
weapons of
mass destruction, although no serious intelligence service
anywhere
in the
world believes it.”
902.
Mr Blair
cited the UNMOVIC “clusters” document issued on 7 March as
“a
remarkable
document”, detailing “all the unanswered questions about Iraq’s
weapons
of mass
destruction”, listing “29 different areas in which the inspectors
have been unable
to obtain
information”.
903.
Describing the
activity in the Security Council since 7 March, Mr Blair
argued
that, “had
we meant what we said in resolution 1441”, the Security Council
should
have
convened when UNMOVIC published the “clusters” document on 7 March,
and
“condemned
Iraq as in material breach”. Saddam Hussein was “playing the same
old
games in
the same old way”. There were “minor concessions”, but there had
been
“no fundamental
change of heart or mind”.
561