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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Introduction
1.  This Section addresses:
the conclusion of negotiations on the status of UK forces in Iraq;
decisions on the drawdown and withdrawal of UK troops;
the UK’s objectives for its ongoing relationship with Iraq; and
assessments of the UK’s legacy, particularly in Basra and the South.
2.  This Section does not address:
the UK contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and reform of its security sector,
which are covered in Sections 10 and 12 respectively.
3.  The Inquiry’s conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can be
read in Section 9.8.
May 2008
4.  On 1 May, at the request of the MOD, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
assessed the strength of those groups and networks which had historically posed an
immediate threat to Iraq’s stability, and the extent to which the Iraqi Special Forces were
ready to tackle those threats.1
5.  The JIC judged that nationalist Sunni insurgents no longer represented an immediate
threat to Iraq’s overall stability. Sectarian violence had subsided and, since the middle
of 2007, many Sunni insurgents had refrained from attacking the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) and the Multi-National Force (MNF) in favour of working with them to resist
Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I).
6.  The JIC assessed that 70,000 Sunnis had joined MNF-sponsored security forces,
known as “Sons of Iraq”. The JIC judged that their motivation for doing so was “partly
financial and partly born of a growing sense that AQ-I represents their most immediate
threat – plus recognition that MNF cannot be defeated and will eventually leave Iraq
anyway”.
7.  The JIC judged:
“Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups are likely to remain an
immediate threat to the MNF. They are increasingly fragmented and are unlikely to
have a strategic impact on stability in Iraq without the support of mainstream JAM.
Unless faced with a common threat from ISF, the GoI or MNF, as recently in Basra
and Baghdad, such support is unlikely.”
1 JIC Assessment, 1 May 2008, ‘Iraq Insurgency: The Hardest Nuts to Crack’.
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