3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
France’s
“contention” that “Iraq’s co‑operation was pretty good so far” did
not “echo
in the
Council”. But, at the same time, “all other Council members want to
give the
inspections longer”.
875.
Sir Jeremy
recommended that the UK’s approach to forthcoming
discussions
of Iraq
in the Security Council should be to:
•
Hammer home
the message that further time would be “a cop‑out”. It
would
give “the
Iraqis comfort” and mean that they did not need to “take the
necessary
steps to
comply”. Assuring Iraq that the Security Council was “determined
and
willing to
contemplate force” was the only solution to getting the Iraqis to
“crack”.
Persuading
France to change its position would be the key to influencing
others.
•
Continue
working as hard as possible to provide a “smoking gun” (or denial
of
access)
through UNMOVIC. That was “indispensible” and the UK should
“fight
for time”
for that. The planned presentation by Secretary Powell, to the
Security
Council on
5 February, would need to be convincing: “A weak presentation
will
leave us
worse off.”
•
Develop our
thinking on a second resolution: “Most crucially and rapidly
we
need a
clearer understanding of our legal bottom lines.” The “most
realistic way
forward may
well be an ultimatum”. Further work would be needed “on how
best
that might
be constructed (e.g. making use of the UNMOVIC
clusters)”.
876.
Sir Jeremy
stated that he would need discretion on the best moment to
float
a second
resolution, but at that stage he did not envisage the issue coming
to a
head before
the second half of February. Securing a second resolution would, in
his
view,
take time. Secretary Powell’s address to the Security Council
would be used
to encourage
discussion.
877.
Sir Jeremy
concluded:
“Securing a
second resolution is going to take time and some coaching of
the
Security
Council. Resolution 1441 took four times as long as we first
imagined.
Our policy
as we go into the meetings … [with President Bush] is therefore
well
justified.
A more nuanced and consultative approach by the US, even for a
few
days, would
also work wonders – focused more on why we need to deal with
Iraqi
non‑compliance
and less on the relentless drive to an inevitable war.
Powell’s
decision to
address the Security Council has to be used as discussion
time,
not just a
lecture.”
161