6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
175.
Dr Rice was
firm: there could be no high-level UN administrator or
UN
involvement
in running even technical Iraqi ministries.
176.
At the meeting
of the trilateral UN working group in Washington on 5 February,
the
UK
delegation, headed by Mr Pattison, shared preliminary UK
thinking on the potential
scope and
structure of UN involvement in a transitional civil administration
with a US
inter-agency
team led by Mr Abrams.91
177.
Mr Pattison
reiterated that the UK believed that UN involvement in
post-conflict
administration
would produce political and practical benefits
including:
•
local
support for an international reforming presence;
•
the
potential for burden sharing and “capturing expertise”;
and
•
better
prospects for an exit strategy.
178.
The UK
understood that the US would seek to maintain freedom of operations
on
security,
SSR and the pursuit of WMD and war criminals, but the UK believed
that it was
possible to
devise a “hybrid” structure that would meet UK and US concerns and
achieve
a
prosperous, stable and representative Iraq. Mr Pattison added
that “UN involvement
in an
international presence was a top priority for the UK as the Prime
Minister had told
Bush”.
179.
The UK
presented elements of a draft Security Council resolution,
emphasising
that these
did not represent an agreed UK position. Key elements
included:
•
a Coalition
security presence with a broad security mandate, headed by
a
US general;
•
a civilian
transitional administration with a defined reformist mandate
and
monitoring
function, headed by a UN executive administrator;
•
a separate
political process involving a Special Representative of
the
Secretary-General
along the lines of the Bonn (Afghanistan) or Dayton
(Bosnia Herzegovina)
models;
•
a
consultative mechanism to involve the Iraqi people;
and
•
a Joint
Implementation Board (JIB) consisting of representatives of
the
international
security presence and international civilian presence.
180.
Mr Abrams
commented that the UK seemed to envisage a much larger role
for
the UN than
the US had been considering. The US continued to be cautious
about
embracing a
more extensive role for the UN and was sceptical about the UN’s
ability
to deliver.
91
Telegram
167 Washington to FCO London, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
US/UK/Australia talks on
“Day After” Issues’.
341