9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
facing the
Coalition are many, and there is still doubt over how quickly
Washington
and the UN
will be able to move money and people to Baghdad to really
start
rebuilding
services and laying a base for economic reconstruction. Resentment
will
grow daily
if life does not become easier soon. But Bremer is getting a grip.
We will
not always
agree with him, e.g. on the role of the UN and the threat from
Tehran.
But his
energy, intelligence and management skills mean we are much better
served
now he is
here.”
376.
In terms of
financing the reconstruction effort, Mr Sawers judged
that:
“Passing
the UNSCR will be a great boon, especially by freeing up Iraqi
assets and
allowing
oil to be sold without controversy. But the road ahead will be a
long slog.”
377.
Mr Sawers
reported positively on working relations with Ambassador Bremer,
who
“arrived
thinking ‘US’ but with me at his elbow he quickly switched to
‘Coalition’”, and
reported
being given “a near equal hand in the political
process”.
378.
Mr Sawers’
views were echoed by Sir David Manning, who told Mr Blair in
the
report of
his visit that “ORHA is the shambles already described by John
Sawers …
A huge,
disorganised, dysfunctional outfit … But I found Bremer impressive.
He will get
a grip,
and wants our help.”255
379.
Gen Walker
briefed the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 21 May, observing
that
“senior US
military and ORHA figures in theatre were seeking to import the
model of the
UK’s
success in Basra to the Capital to help stabilise the
situation”.256
380.
Three options
had been identified, of which the recommended one was
the
short‑term
deployment of 16 Air Assault Brigade to Baghdad. The minutes record
that
Gen Walker
“directed PJHQ to conduct an estimate” of the proposal “to inform
COS
[Chiefs of
Staff] advice to Ministers”.
381.
Specific
questions that should be addressed included: what effects were
required
on the
ground; what intelligence was available in Baghdad; what was the
threat in
Baghdad to
UK troops; was the proposal a sound military plan; would the morale
of
the Brigade
withstand the re-tasking and extended tour; would this option
deliver the
necessary
effect; what was the exit strategy; and how would this option
impact on
operations
in the UK Area of Operation?
382.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that the US was “unlikely to be able to deploy a
suitable
unit to
Baghdad in the timescale required” but it was also:
“…
necessary for the UK not to establish a reputation with the US of
being the
follow‑up
country of choice and, therefore, it was important for the US to
request
the UK
undertake the role rather than to volunteer the
capability.”
255
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Visit to Baghdad and
Basra’.
256
Minutes, 21
May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
199