6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
241.
The section of
the paper on post-conflict tasks stated:
“This will
depend on how regime change occurs, and what shape the
campaign
takes to
bring about the change. However, key differences between Iraq and
recent
experience
in Afghanistan and Balkans are:
•
Iraq is
naturally wealthy with significant oil reserves and potential
revenue,
therefore
reconstruction should be self-sufficient, with cash from
OFF
escrow
account providing significant pump priming as compared
to
Afghanistan
or Balkans.
•
Iraq has a
sound agricultural base (‘fertile crescent’).
•
Educated and
able technical, industrial, and managerial population
exists.
•
Although
ethnic suppression has occurred there is limited regional
inter-
ethnic
mixing as compared to Afghanistan and Balkans.
•
International
intervention is not in tandem with ongoing, and in the case
of
Afghanistan,
prolonged civil war.”
242.
The paper
listed likely short-, medium- and long-term post-conflict military
tasks:
“Immediate
(0 – 6 months):
•
Provide
external and internal security, law and order to prevent any
potential
for
inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised
crime
•
Detention
and processing of key regime figures …
•
Confine and
monitor remaining elements of Iraqi Armed Forces likely
to
rebel
…
•
Secure and
account for WMD capability (materiel and intellectual)
•
Enable
humanitarian relief
•
Assist in
restoration of key infrastructure elements
•
Secure
oilfields and oil distribution/refining infrastructure
•
Negotiate
and secure alternative lines of communication (LoC)
through
Syria/Turkey/Jordan
•
Scope of
tasks likely to demand large numbers of ground troops,
comprehensive
C2 [command and control] and air mobility (circa
200,000
plus)
“Medium
Term (6 months – 2 plus years)
•
Continue to
provide both external and internal security, law and order
to
prevent any
potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for
organised
crime, but
commence transfer of requirement to new Iraqi security
structures
•
Detention
and processing of key regime figures
155