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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
806.  Addressing the problems encountered by the inspectors, Mr Blair placed the issues
being addressed firmly in the context of:
“… an 11-year history … of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about the
existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and of obstruction,
defiance and denial.
“There is one common, consistent theme … the total determination of Saddam
to maintain that programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions and
the isolation of the Iraqi economy …”
807.  Addressing the question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in mid-September,
but not before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated the answer was in the
dossier, and it was because:
“… his chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic left-over from
1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons
of mass destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy of
containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not
shut down; it is up and running now.”
808.  Mr Blair stated that the dossier disclosing the intelligence assessments provided
by the JIC had been produced because it was “important to explain our concerns about
Saddam to the British people”. He added that people were going to:
“… have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but
this is what they are telling me … and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture
that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed
and authoritative.
“It concludes Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued
to produce them, that he has existing and active plans for the use of chemical and
biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against
his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons
capability.”
809.  Addressing the content of the dossier, Mr Blair told Parliament that:
As well as the chemical agents and precursor chemicals, growth media for
anthrax and special munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological agents
that were “missing and unaccounted for” in 1998, Iraq continued “to produce
chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across
Iraq; has brought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained key personnel …
and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all
of it well funded”.
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