The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
806.
Addressing the
problems encountered by the inspectors, Mr Blair placed the
issues
being
addressed firmly in the context of:
“… an
11-year history … of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about
the
existence
of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and of
obstruction,
defiance
and denial.
“There is
one common, consistent theme … the total determination of
Saddam
to maintain
that programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions
and
the isolation
of the Iraqi economy …”
807.
Addressing the
question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in
mid-September,
but not
before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated the
answer was in the
dossier,
and it was because:
“… his
chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic
left-over from
1998. The
inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His
weapons
of mass
destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy
of
containment
is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is
not
shut down;
it is up and running now.”
808.
Mr Blair
stated that the dossier disclosing the intelligence assessments
provided
by the JIC
had been produced because it was “important to explain our concerns
about
Saddam to
the British people”. He added that people were going
to:
“… have to
take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence
services, but
this is
what they are telling me … and my senior colleagues. The
intelligence picture
that they
paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive,
detailed
and
authoritative.
“It
concludes Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has
continued
to produce
them, that he has existing and active plans for the use of chemical
and
biological
weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including
against
his own
Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear
weapons
capability.”
809.
Addressing the
content of the dossier, Mr Blair told Parliament
that:
•
As well as
the chemical agents and precursor chemicals, growth media
for
anthrax and
special munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological
agents
that were
“missing and unaccounted for” in 1998, Iraq continued “to
produce
chemical
weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants
across
Iraq; has
brought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained key personnel
…
and has
a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production,
all
of it
well funded”.
270