8 | The
invasion
After major
combat operations ended, DSF1 told the Inquiry, UK Special Forces
moved to
Baghdad,
because:
“That’s
where our main principal linkage, that’s where my sense of how we
could best
support …
my view is that Special Forces quite rightly operate at a higher
level, and
therefore
it is about actually the success of the campaign.” 289
DSF2 told
the Inquiry that when he assumed command in 2003, the main force
was
in Baghdad
“on a mission from CJO to assist the people finding weapons of
mass
442.
Maj Gen Binns
told the Inquiry that he had not felt constrained by the absence
of
a policy on
what to do when Basra fell.291
Nor had his
forces trained for that role. He felt
he had
sufficient freedom of action and the experience and knowledge from
previous
operations,
including operations with some of 7 Armoured Brigade in Pristina
(Kosovo),
to know
what to do and to create the environment for
stability.
443.
Gen Jackson
told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 11 April that anarchic
behaviour
in Baghdad,
and earlier in Basra, was directed mainly at the regime, and was
not
generalised
lawlessness.292
It would be
some days before the situation calmed down
in Baghdad;
in Basra, the adaptability of British troops in managing security
had had a
good
effect. The problem was that civil policing had largely disappeared
because of its
association
with the Ba’athist regime and would be difficult to resurrect
because of the
vulnerability
of individuals to reprisals. This is considered in more detail in
Section 12.1.
444.
Mr Hoon
said that responsibility for security fell in the first instance to
the military
and the UK
was active in encouraging police in the South to return to duty.
The Office
of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) – described in
detail in
Section 10.1
– would be involved in restoring the civil administration of
Iraq.
445.
Ms Short
stated that the ICRC and UN agencies were concerned
about
lawlessness
in Baghdad and elsewhere. Hospitals in particular needed to be
secured.
The systems
in place for the distribution of food and the restoration of the
water supply
were
disabled by the lack of security.
446.
Mr Scarlett
told those present that the vacuum created by the collapse of
the
regime was
being filled in different ways in different parts of the country.
Gen Jackson
stated that
the US was putting forces into Kirkuk and Mosul, the latter to take
the
surrender
of elements of the Regular Army.
289
Private
hearing, 2010, page 26.
290
Private
hearing, 2010, page 2.
291
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, pages 10-14.
292
Minutes, 11
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
81