12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
forces”.13
The
strategy’s longer‑term objective was “to establish an effective,
viable
and sustainable
police force within a fully functioning security
sector”.
22.
The initial
action would be deployment of “an armed International Police
Monitoring
Force … to
Baghdad and Basra, to conduct joint patrols with the current Iraqi
police
force and
Coalition military”, requiring 3,000 armed police officers. Once
the Iraqi police
were
considered to have received sufficient initial training, the
international presence
would shift
to a longer‑term training focus, eventually taking on a mentoring
role. UND
suggested
agreeing a strategy on how to reform the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
by
14 June
and that the international force should be in place by 31
August.
23.
The AHMGIR,
under Mr Straw’s chairmanship, did not discuss how the
strategy
would be
implemented, or consider inconsistencies with the Coalition
Provisional
Authority
(CPA) plans for police reform, as highlighted by the MOD. The MOD
had been
in touch
with Mr Bernard Kerik, a former New York City Police
Commissioner and the
CPA
Director of Interior Affairs. As a result, the MOD considered that
the FCO’s policing
strategy
was “about three weeks behind the curve”14
because
Mr Kerik did not want an
international
force – instead he wanted 7,000 trainers. UND suggested maintaining
its
approach
until the US produced a policing strategy.
24.
As set out in
Section 9.8, the UK struggled to have a decisive impact on
CPA
policies.
25.
In July,
responsibilities for SSR within the CPA were divided. Mr Kerik
took on
responsibility
for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI), including policing, fire,
customs,
border
control, immigration, passports, citizenship and disaster relief.
Mr Walt Slocombe,
CPA Senior
Advisor for National Security and Defense, focused on the
development
of the
Iraqi armed forces. That split was seen by the UK as a set‑back to
agreeing a
coherent
national SSR strategy.
26.
By mid‑July,
there were just four senior UK personnel in Iraq working across
SSR
as a whole
(including reform of the police and army).The FCO had deployed
Acting
Deputy
Chief Constable Douglas Brand to lead the UK’s attempt to influence
the CPA
police
reform programme and Acting Deputy Chief Constable Stephen White to
lead on
policing in
Basra. DCC White was accompanied by two MOD police
officers.
27.
SSR strategies
began to develop on a regional basis, largely in isolation
from
each other.
28.
On 17 July,
the AHMGIR discussed a paper by the IPU which stated that there
“was
still no
cohesive strategy”15
but that
this was “not necessarily a cause for current alarm”
13
Minute
Straw to Blair, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Winning the Peace’ attaching
Paper UND, 3 June 2003,
‘Iraq: Security
Sector Reform: Policing Strategy’.
14
Email UND
[junior official] to Lowe [MOD], 9 June 2003, ‘Policing Meeting –
Tuesday 10 June’.
15
Annotated
Agenda, 17 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting
attaching Paper IPU,
16 July 2003,
‘Security Sector Reform the Next Steps’.
419