The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1003.
On 8 March,
the Chiefs of Staff discussed and endorsed the Force
Level
Review.534
The minutes
recorded that one of the points highlighted by
Lt Gen Houghton
was that,
despite the withdrawal of two helicopters, helicopter flying hours
would be
“sustained
by the more efficient use of other assets”.
1004.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that “the withdrawal of Phoenix would leave an
ISTAR
deficit”
and MND(SE) had “already been tasked to review its ISTAR
requirements”.
Possible
“mitigation was by the availability of unused Nimrod MR2 hours and
the
possibility
of negotiating US Predator tasking”. Gen Jackson would explore
the
possibility
of using Islander aircraft from Northern Ireland to provide Manned
Aerial
Surveillance.
1005.
On the same
day, Dr Reid was informed that “minor adjustments” were
being
made to the
number of support helicopters “through increased
efficiency”.535
1006.
On 4 April,
the DOC published its third report of Op TELIC lessons to cover
the
period from
1 December 2004 to 28 February 2006.536
1007.
The report
contained a section on “National Issues” described as “issues
that
warrant
MOD’s attention due to the impact on operational capability”. Such
issues
affected
“not only Iraq but may have a wider significance for other
operations, including
Afghanistan”.
Those issues included: counter IED capability (as addressed earlier
in this
Section
with regard to protected mobility), ISTAR, helicopters, air
transport and force
protection
engineering.
1008.
On ISTAR, the
DOC stated that within Iraq there remained “a serious
gap
in current
ISTAR capability – particularly in urban areas”. That was “a
regular DOC
observation
that has been highlighted on all recent operations”.
1009.
The report
cited “a specific problem with surveillance generally and
with
UAVs
specifically”, referring to the “identified gap” between the
Phoenix OSD and
Watchkeeper
ISD of two years. That situation “had changed again” and the
Watchkeeper
ISD had
slipped to “Not to Extend (NTE) beyond January 2011”.
1010.
The MOD
Investment Approvals Board (IAB) had directed that the gap
should
be viewed
in two parts: theatre‑specific in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008,
and the
generic
contingent war‑fighting tactical UAV capability from 2007 to 2010.
There was the
additional,
shorter‑term problem that Phoenix could only operate in winter, and
Desert
Hawk was
incompatible with electronic countermeasures. The Combined Joint
Predator
UAV Task
Force (CJPTF) provided “limited coverage of MND(SE)”.
534
Minutes, 8
March 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
535
Minute DJC
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 8 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Force
Level Review (FLR) for
May 2006
Roulement’.
536
Report DOC,
4 April 2006, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume
3’.
170