3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
566.
Sir David
Manning provided a separate checklist of topics which described
the
objective
on Iraq as:
“Commitment
from Bush to transparency and consultation. (The model
is
Afghanistan.)
We need to start US/UK military planning (i.e. access for UK
military
planners in
Washington and CENTCOM – the point CDS made at
Chequers).”217
567.
The Overseas
and Defence Secretariat advised Sir David Manning on 5
April:
•
The Iraq
‘Options Paper’ remained “current”.
•
Mr Annan
met an Iraqi delegation on 7 March. The Iraqis had made no
specific
commitments
to co-operate with UN resolutions and posed 19 questions
about
US/UK
policies. The majority were polemics but some were about
clarification
of
resolution 1284. Mr Annan wanted the Security Council to answer
those
questions
before further talks scheduled for 18/19 April. The UK position
was
that Mr
Annan had no mandate to negotiate with Iraq and that he should
urge
them to
talk to UNMOVIC and the IAEA about readmitting weapons
inspectors.
•
The US was
working on a draft UN resolution to encapsulate recent
agreements
with Russia
on the Goods Review List.218
568.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had “decided that he wanted to be
totally
supportive
but also push for more US engagement”.219
He “would
make clear that
the
UK would support the US on Iraq, but also make the point about
UN inspectors
effectively
as an ultimatum”. For the first time that Mr Campbell could recall,
Mr Blair had
produced
“his own written checklist for the meeting” with President Bush. Mr
Blair had
wanted “to
do Iraq and MEPP first so that he knew where he was”.
569.
Mr Blair
met President Bush at Crawford, Texas, on 5 and 6 April. Much of
the
discussion
took place in private meetings between the two
leaders.
570.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that President Bush and Mr Blair had
dined
together
[on the evening of Friday 5 April] and that there was a more formal
meeting on
the
Saturday morning.220
Sir David
stressed that the discussions at Crawford had been
about “many
other things as well as Iraq” particularly the Middle East Peace
Process.
571.
A three-page
record of the discussions on Iraq was circulated on a secret
and
strictly
personal basis by Sir David Manning in a letter to Mr McDonald
which was sent
217
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 4 April 2002, ‘Crawford
Checklist’.
218
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 5 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.
219
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
220
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 14-15.
491