The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

137. Mr Hoon expressed caution about both the timescales required for a UK

deployment and the impact of potential industrial action by the Fire Brigades

Union in the autumn.

138. Mr Blair was advised that no decision was needed at that stage.

139. Following the 23 July meeting, No.10 asked the MOD to provide details of the

proposed military campaign, and options for a UK contribution.65

140. Mr Bowen sent Mr Hoon a fuller analysis of the options for a UK contribution on

25 July.66 He advised:

• It would take another couple of months to increase forces to medium scale.

• “To meet probable US timescales” it would “not be possible to deploy a fully

prepared, fully sustainable armoured division for war-fighting”. A fully prepared

and sustained armoured division (one which could fight a significant Iraqi force)

would take 10 months.

• Deployment of an armoured division (minus) would only be possible “within

six months of a decision to deploy”, and would have “limited sustainment

and reach”.

141. On 26 July, further MOD advice on options for a UK contribution to US-led military

operations in Iraq was provided in a letter from Mr Watkins to Mr Matthew Rycroft,

Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs.67

142. Adm Boyce had recommended three options:

• Package 1 – an “in-place support package” using forces already in the region.

• Package 2 – an “enhanced support package” comprising Package 1 with

additional air and maritime forces. While no conventional land forces could meet

the timescales for the deployment of maritime and air forces: “Special Forces

could be deployed very rapidly to match US timescales and priorities. This is

likely to be very attractive to US planners, and their contribution to success

would be significant …”

• Package 3 – a “discrete UK package” based on deployment of an armoured

division which the MOD envisaged would be used in northern Iraq, in addition to

the forces in Package 2. The UK might consider providing an armoured division

either as part of a US-led Corps or as part of a larger coalition force possibly

led by the UK using the framework of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

[ARRC].”

65 Minute Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002 ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting, 23 July: Follow Up’.

66 Minute Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 25 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK Contribution’.

67 Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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