The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Iraq) assessed that those drawn from the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force and the elite

Iraqi Intervention Force were “capable”, but expressed concern about troops deployed

from the regular Iraqi Army.142

276. The Black Watch began its deployment to North Babil on 26 October and left

39 days later, on 4 December.143

277. Following discussion between the Attorney General, the MOD and FCO officials,

on 27 October Ms Adams replied to Ms Rose’s letter of 15 October.144

278. Ms Adams reported Lord Goldsmith’s agreement with the military assessment

that the level of violence in parts of Iraq constituted a state of armed conflict. It would

be impractical to operate under different rules in different geographical areas but Lord

Goldsmith felt it important that the revised Targeting Directive said explicitly that force

was “only authorised where it is strictly necessary and proportionate”.

279. On 27 October, the JIC conducted a review of insurgencies in Iraq at the request

of the FCO.145

280. The JIC judged that there was “no unified national insurgency” although “all

insurgent groups have a perceived common enemy: the MNF-I and Iraqis who support

the ‘occupation’”. In general:

“The level of sustained violence in Iraq shows no sign of diminishing. The

considerable efforts of the Multi-National Forces (MNF) and the Iraqi security

forces (ISF) are constraining the insurgents but not defeating them.”

281. The JIC judged that, of the groups operating:

“The Sunni Arab insurgents have the greatest depth and means to conduct a

long-term campaign. They pose the most serious threat to the Iraqi government.

They enjoy a degree of popular sympathy within the Sunni community. The Iraqi

government’s outreach efforts have not yet diminished this.

“The scale of the Sunni Arab insurgency will be influenced in the short term by

events in Fallujah. More broadly, it will be affected by the outcome of the January

elections – a result which deepens Sunni political exclusion could fuel the violence

– and by the MNF presence, against which the overwhelming majority of attacks

are directed. A significant Sunni insurgency will probably continue through 2005

and beyond.

142 Telegram 301 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah: Military Preparations: ISF

Numbers and Capability’.

143 MOD Defence Factsheet, [undated], Operations in Iraq: News and Events, January-December 2004.

144 Letter Adams to Rose, 27 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Revision of Op TELIC Targeting Directive and position

of embedded personnel’.

145 JIC Assessment, 27 October 2004, ‘Iraq: A Long-Term Insurgency Problem’.

440