10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
good that
the Iraqi Army had sought to take control, but the way in which it
had done so
threatened
to have a negative impact on political and economic progress, as
well as the
security
gains achieved by UK forces. The UK “could not afford to be
perceived to be
irrelevant
to the situation in Basra”.
919.
Mr Browne
said that there were now US forces involved in Basra, and they
were
unlikely to
leave.
920.
Ministers
agreed that troop levels should remain at 4,100 until the
situation
became clearer
and that no decision on longer-term military commitment should
be
taken at
present.
921.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Brown said that hopes for political and
economic
stability
to take hold in Basra had been “set back”. The UK needed to wait
and assess
the
implications of events “but work to bring our political and
economic objectives back
on
line”.
922.
The Iraqi
Government and the US moved quickly to boost reconstruction in
Basra
in the wake
of the Charge of the Knights.
923.
The UK was
concerned that the wave of new money, the focus on
short-term
projects,
and the actions of central Government would undermine existing
Provincial
Government
structures and systems (which the UK had helped to
establish).
924.
Mr Prentice
attended the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on National Security
on
6 April,
and reported that the Iraqi Government’s main priority was finding
civilian
employment
for 25,000 unemployed Basrawis.540
Acting
Justice Minister Dr Safa al-Safi
had been
appointed to co-ordinate the Iraqi Government’s economic efforts in
Basra.
925.
The British
Embassy Office Basra reported on 7 April that a nine-strong US
Civil
Military
Operating Centre (CMOC) would arrive later that day, and would be
operational
within 24
hours.541
The PRT had
welcomed their arrival. The CMOC’s focus would be on
shorter-term
employment schemes (“how to get young men off the payroll of JAM
and
other
militias”).
926.
The British
Embassy Office Basra reported the following day that it would
be
important
that the CMOC shared the UK’s philosophy that “we not do things for
the
Iraqis, but
with them”.542
927.
A DFID
official in Baghdad reported to DFID colleagues on 9 April that the
Iraqi
Council of
Ministers had agreed to provide US$100m for economic work in
Basra.543
Dr al-Safi
had arrived in Basra and had set up a number of committees. In
parallel,
540
eGram
13078/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Committee on National
Security,
06 April 2008’.
541
eGram
13086/08 Basra to FCO London, 7 April 2008, ‘Basra Update – 7 April
2008’.
542
eGram
13285/08 Basra to FCO London, 7 April 2008, ‘Basra Update – 8 April
2008’.
543
Email DFID
[junior official] to DFID [junior official], 9 April 2008,
‘Basra’.
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