6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
them, and
for military planners generally, to agree what our scale of
effort
should be in
our medium-term contribution to Iraq.”
1162.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon advised that it would be necessary to reduce the
UK
military
contribution “to nearer a third by no later than the autumn in
order to avoid
long-term
damage to the Armed Forces” and to remain within current defence
planning
assumptions:
“If Ministers wanted us to, we would need decisions now so that we
would
be able to
recommend what would have to give elsewhere.” Scaling down to
nearer a
third would
limit the UK contribution thereafter to “a maximum of around one
brigade, a
two-star
headquarters and possibly a contribution to higher level command
and control”.
They
recommended telling the US now, for planning purposes, that this
was the upper
limit of
the UK contribution.
1163.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon also recorded that the ARRC featured in
current
CENTCOM
planning as a multinational headquarters that could play a role
in
post‑conflict
Iraq, but would be the subject of a separate paper (see Section
9.1).
1164.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon ended with a section on “Setting
the conditions for
success”. The
conditions in which UK forces operated needed to be conducive
to
success.
There needed to be a resolution authorising international activity
in the
post-conflict
period and: “We should also let the US know the key importance
of
internationalising
the security arrangements now so that we can reduce our
commitment
as set out
above. And we would expect US support in building a wider Coalition
to
operate
alongside our forces, allow us to draw down and eventually to
provide us with
an exit
strategy.”
1165.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon concluded:
“We should
be realistic about the limited prospects of our finding any
genuine
military
capability to help us take this task on. New … Coalition partners
are thin on
the ground
and, if the post-conflict phase does not go well, there will not be
many
nations who
will be prepared or able to take part.
“And
finally, we shall need to return to this issue once we are clear
how the
campaign is
developing and look at our wider contribution in the
round.”
1166.
The Cabinet
Office took a different position on whether it would
be
“premature”
to take a view on the merits of sectors.
1167.
Before the
joint minute from Mr Straw and Mr Hoon reached
No.10,
Mr Drummond
advised Mr Rycroft that “we need Ministers to decide on
sectors”. The
joint
minute and the question of sectors should be on the agenda for the
Ad Hoc Meeting
on Iraq
(the “War Cabinet”) on 20 March, with Ms Short given the chance to
comment on
the minute
on her return from the US on 21 March.501
501
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial
Meeting’.
519