The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The UK was
not “well‑balanced” to match US ability to escalate action
rapidly
and, if UK
forces were to be deployed alongside the US, there was a “need
to
match US
planning aspirations”.
•
WMD, the
composition and methods of the current Iraqi regime, and where
the
fracture
lines existed in the current regime, were identified as the areas
where
a “much
more detailed level of intelligence” was required.
•
The UK
“must accept” that it was “likely that our visibility of WMD may
even
deteriorate
as Saddam prepares for conflict”.
•
Any
replacement regime would need to renounce WMD.
•
A much more
detailed analysis of the need for international support and
the
risks
associated with the position of individual countries was required.
Turkey
would be a
“critical” ally and would “call for a delicate political balance”
which
would
“require … military support”. Ensuring Turkey’s support would
require
identification
of “credible political carrots”, enhanced military aid and
“effective
military
links to Kurdish guerrilla groups”.
•
Iraq
provided a “balance” to Iran and needed “either … to retain
significant
military
capability or international guarantees”. The paper also asked
whether
Iran would
be the “next candidate of axis of evil?”
•
Saddam
Hussein’s “best chance” would be “to prevent the deployment
of
coalition
forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see
the
operation
through to success …”
•
Information
operations would play a key part in Phases 2 and 3 of the
campaign.
•
Taking
military action during “Window 1” would require management
of
consequences
after military action, “Strike then
Shape”. “Window
2” would be
“more
deliberate”, and was characterised as “Shape then
Strike”.
•
There was a
definition of possible UK contributions as Packages 1, 2 and 3
and
the
initial, high‑level identification of key shortfalls in
readiness.
•
There was
the identification of a fourth, “Siege”
option for a military campaign,
which would
entail “seizing one or more pieces of territory (probably in the
North
and South)
and, in effect, laying siege to the regime”. That had “received
some
support in
the Press and from academics”. It could achieve the end state
“with
little
fighting, but the political risks” were “high”.
367.
PJHQ submitted
an assessment of the CENTCOM plan on 12 July, which
identified
the
possible scope and scale of a UK contribution as:
•
enablers,
including Special Forces;
•
support of
the US “Main Effort” through Kuwait with armoured forces up to
a
division
(minus) and/or light forces at brigade strength; and
230