8 | The
invasion
463.
Mr Iain
Duncan Smith, the Leader of the Opposition, congratulated
Mr Blair for
the “heavy
burden” that he had carried and added, “but he will have been
comforted
throughout
by the conviction that he was doing the right thing for Britain and
for the rest
464.
Mr Scarlett
informed the 16 April Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq, chaired by
Mr Prescott,
that
organised Iraqi resistance had ceased.308
The threat
to Coalition Forces was from
paramilitaries,
concentrated particularly in Baghdad. In the North, there was the
potential
for
inter-ethnic clashes.
465.
Adm Boyce
stated that military operations were directed at confronting
terrorism,
mainly from
foreign volunteers. The US was reducing its armoured presence
in
Baghdad. In
Basra and the South, normalisation continued with increased
policing
and the
population returning to work.
466.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Prescott said that it was important to continue
to
improve
conditions for Iraqis. There were questions about the number of
troops still on
standby for
fire-fighting duties arising from the “upcoming proposition to
replace British
military
units now in Iraq with others from the United Kingdom”. He would
take forward
discussions
with Mr Hoon before reporting to Mr Blair.
467.
Gen Franks
issued his “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People” on 16
April
(see Section
9.1).
468.
The
evidence set out in Section 6.1 about the debate on the UK
contribution
to a US-led
military campaign shows how the scale and nature of the
UK
contribution
were regularly cited as vital for securing UK influence on the
US
military
timetable and on the campaign plan.
469.
It is not
possible to determine with certainty the degree to which the
UK
influenced
the planning and conduct of the military campaign in Iraq, or
whether
the scale
and nature of the UK contribution were the key factors in
securing
such influence.
470.
There will
have been specific areas in which individuals working directly
with
US
colleagues, as well as the UK Government as a whole, did have an
impact.
471.
Influence
on operational decisions which directly affected
participating
UK forces,
for instance on their roles or the targets to be attacked, was
more
likely to
be achieved than influence on higher-level decisions. The quality
of the
307
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 14 April
2003, column 618.
308
Minutes, 16
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
85