The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
332.
The meeting
discussed particular shortfalls, including:
•
There was a
need to “find a better way of explaining the improvements”
being
made to
Challenger 2 tanks.
•
There was
still no assurance that the US would loan Combat ID assets –
Lt Gen
Reith was
being briefed “to raise this personally” with General Tommy
Franks,
Commander
US Central Command (CENTCOM).
•
“
…[I]nnovative measures were in place to acquire sufficient stocks
of desert
clothing
and boots for at least two sets to be provided to all personnel
in
theatre by
mid-March” and Lord Bach asked officials to review with industry
the
practicality
of extending the number of personnel issued with three sets to
cover
all those
deploying.
•
There
remained concerns about NBC capabilities – Lord Bach requested
further
advice on
the operational risk within three days.
333.
On
28 January, Mr Hoon asked Adm Boyce for “a clear
recommendation from
the Chiefs
of Staff” as to whether UK forces could “participate in the
operational plan
as
currently understood, particularly the potential start of major
ground operations on
334.
If this was
not possible, Adm Boyce was asked on what date land forces
could
participate
and what date would be the “implied start of initial combat
operations”.
The advice
was requested by 3pm the following day.
335.
ACM Bagnall’s
Private Office replied on 29 January, stating:
“There are,
in absolute terms, no showstoppers. In the case of maritime forces,
all
UORs should
be in place by 28 February. Some contractual risk remains, but
the
systems
involved carry a low operational risk. In the air environment, the
force will
be ready
for operation by 28 February …
“The land
environment carries the greatest risk in two areas: Challenger 2
and
Combat
Identification.”159
336.
The work in
hand for Challenger 2 vehicles suggested that their availability
and
serviceability
would “improve significantly” by 18 March when certain
modifications were
due to be
completed. The situation would improve again after 7 April
when new filters
were
fitted.
337.
For Combat ID,
systems to improve situational awareness within the UK and
US
forces were
currently being evaluated in Germany. It was “not yet clear”
whether they
could “be
integrated into a UK vehicle in the time available” but early
indications were
that the
work was “proceeding well”.
158
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to PSO/CDS, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
UORs’.
159
Minute
MA/VCDS to PS/SofS [MOD], 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq –
UORs’.
52