The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
opinion was
moving against military action but suggested it could be brought
round.
Mr Blair’s
preference was to wait until the end of February, including to
allow further
reports
from Dr Blix, which would highlight Iraq’s non‑compliance, and
give time to
work on
Security Council members.
840.
Mr Blair
thanked Mr Aznar for his role in the joint article and stated
that he would
propose “a
system of communications co‑ordination” to President
Bush.
841.
Asked what
would happen if there was no second resolution, Mr Blair
responded
that “he
thought military action would follow anyway, but in far tougher
political
circumstances”;
and “The aftermath would be much easier to handle if the
UN
had authorised
military action and the subsequent rebuilding of
Iraq.”
842.
Mr Blair
was sent a number of papers from across Whitehall before
his
meeting
with President Bush.
843.
In preparation
for the meeting with President Bush, Mr Rycroft sent
Mr Blair a pack
of
“background papers” on 30 January.276
He added
that there would be “plenty of other
papers,
including JIC papers to give you on the plane”.
844.
The papers on
Iraq were produced by the FCO, the MOD and the Cabinet
Office.
845.
Mr Jim
Drummond, the Assistant Head of OD Sec (Foreign Policy), sent
Mr Rycroft
a minute
setting out a “few OD Sec points, just in case they slip through
the briefing”
provided by
the FCO and MOD.277
Those
included:
•
the need to
agree joint military campaign objectives for publication
“shortly
before any
conflict starts”; the UK should offer a draft;
•
an offer of
“help on handling Iran”;
•
the
“importance of transparency in the use of oil revenues”;
and
•
the need
for agreement on an “UNMOVIC/IAEA role in finding and
destroying
WMD post
Saddam”.
846.
The MOD
drew attention to the implications which any delay in military
action
beyond the
spring would have for its ability to provide a major contribution
for
military
action, and the need for the US and UK to have agreed military
objectives.
847.
The MOD
briefing of 29 January comprised a general update and sections
on
targeting,
“aftermath”, and Saddam Hussein’s options, including Fortress
Baghdad.278
276
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minster, 30 January 2003, ‘Camp
David’.
277
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US
visit’.
278
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 29 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Briefing –
Iraq’.
154