6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
818.
The meeting
also “agreed that there must be no leaks and no public
announcements
(for instance any notices to Reserves) until after the first UN
resolution
had passed
and after a further discussion” with Mr Blair.
819.
Copies of
Mr Rycroft’s record of the discussion on military options were
sent to
the Private
Offices of Mr Hoon, Mr Straw, Mr Brown and
Sir Andrew Turnbull, and to
Mr Bowen.
820.
The discussion
on the progress and direction of negotiations on a draft
UN
resolution,
which had reached a critical stage, was recorded separately and
is
addressed
in Section 3.5.
821.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote that Adm Boyce had said that he
would have a
real
problem with the Army if they were not properly involved and that
Mr Blair would
have far
greater influence with the US if the UK was there on the
ground.323
Gen Franks
really
needed to know what our answers may be. Mr Blair had said it
was not no, but it
was not yet
yes. He wanted more work done analysing the cost.
822.
Mr Watkins
told officials in the MOD that Mr Blair “did not wish to rule
out Package
3 at this
stage but wished to give the matter further consideration”: “In
terms of our
internal
MOD planning, the position therefore remains essentially
unchanged.”324
The
preliminary objective for UK policy in Iraq agreed by Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon in May,
and
recorded in Mr Hoon’s minute to Mr Blair of 31 May 2002
(see Section 3.3), was
revised in
October.
Mr Bowen
sent Sir David Manning draft strategic policy objectives for
Iraq on 4 October,
explaining
that “Whitehall would find it helpful” to agree objectives “for the
present phase
of
activity” and, “in particular, it would help us in formulating an
information strategy”.325
The Cabinet
Office draft stated that the UK’s prime objective was:
“… to rid
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
associated
programmes
and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles (BM)
… in
accordance
with United Nations Security Council resolutions … an expression of
the
will of the
international community, with which Iraq has persistently failed to
comply,
thereby
perpetuating the threat to international peace and
security.”326
Other
objectives included the desired end‑state for Iraq, to which the
words “and providing
effective
and representative government for its own people” had been added to
the text
agreed by
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon earlier in the year.
323
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
324
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
325
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic Policy
Objectives’.
326
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic Policy
Objectives’.
301