The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
beyond.
This will include some re‑posturing of both our military and
civilian effort.
But our
commitment, both military and civilian, will endure up to and
beyond PIC.”
541.
DOP met on 1
February, chaired by Mr Blair.279
542.
Mr Browne
reported on his recent visit to Iraq. In Basra he had “seen first
hand the
positive
effect that Operation SINBAD had had”; the reported murder rate had
reduced
and
“sectarian violence had almost stopped”. Continued violence was
mainly directed
against
coalition forces. Mr Browne summarised that:
“… despite
the change in tactics and a more cautious approach to
transitioning
to Iraqi
control, the US strategic approach remained the same. The UK
strategy
was
correct, but in order to maintain a capability to target JAM and
assuage US
concerns,
the military were looking again at retaining a presence in Basra
Palace …”
543.
As a
consequence, Mr Browne reported that drawdown to 4,500 troops
would take
“a little
longer”.
544.
Summing up,
Mr Blair concluded that the overall strategy for re‑posturing
and
transition
in southern Iraq remained the right one and invited the MOD to draw
up a
revised
proposal for force levels and timelines, for discussion at a future
meeting. That
should take
into account the potential need for a continued presence at Basra
Palace
and should
set out firm proposals for the arrangements for training and
mentoring the
Iraqi
Security Forces.
545.
On 2 February,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary provided him with an update
on
Iraq.280
He wrote:
“The security situation is poor, and worsening” and listed
several
major incidents
in the preceding week, two of which had caused significant
numbers
of civilian
casualties.
546.
More
positively, the Private Secretary reported signs that the recent
campaign
against
extremist JAM leaders was bearing fruit: several were reportedly
fleeing and
Sadr city
had become “considerably more permissive” than before.
547.
Mr Blair
queried how these two statements could both be true – that
progress
was being
made against JAM yet the security situation was
worsening.281
He
also
noted that
there remained a “big dislocation between [the intelligence]
estimate and
Ros M
[Dr Marsden] & [Maj Gen] Shaw” on the security situation
in Basra.
279
Minutes, 1
February 2007, DOP meeting.
280
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 2 February 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 2
February’.
281
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 2 February 2007,
‘Iraq Update,
2
February’.
102