The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
368.
On the same
day, Secretary Rice told Mrs Beckett that President Bush was
likely
to announce
the conclusions of his review of Iraq policy the following week,
but:
“Contrary
to media reports he had not taken any final decisions on
the
proposed
‘surge’ of 20,000 troops into Baghdad and was still considering
Gates’
369.
The following
day, the Chiefs of Staff were briefed on:
“… the
likelihood that a ‘surge’ of forces would be conducted with the aim
of
‘breaking
sectarian violence as the US transitioned’: associated implications
for the
UK which
included the difficult presentational issue of a UK transition
coinciding with
a US surge
and the possibility that an aggressive anti‑militia campaign in the
North
would
result in increased insurgency in the South …”205
370.
That
possibility meant that there was a “critical need for the UK to
have some
influence
on US operational planning”.
371.
In the
discussion on operations in Afghanistan that followed, Lt Gen
Houghton
explained
that it would be important that the Worcester and Sherwood
Foresters
Regiment
was stood down from Op TELIC by the end of January 2007 “to meet
the
enduring
liability” in Afghanistan.
372.
In his weekly
report on 4 January, Maj Gen Shirreff defended his decision to
attack
the Jameat
police station on Christmas Day:
“If I had
left this up to the Iraqis to do it the Iraqi way (as we did in
October) there
would have
been no operation. I judged that there was an operational
imperative
to carry
out the operation; hence my decision to go for it … I wanted to
send
an
unequivocal message two ways: to our US allies that we are serious
about
conducting
decisive, kinetic operations against the SCU [Serious Crime
Unit]
and corrupt
police if PIC in Basra is to be credible; and a similar message to
the
Iraqi
domestic audience and the people of Basra … If the Sadrists and
their fellow
travellers
have had their noses put out of joint, then so be it. Above all, it
is seen
locally as
a major defeat for JAM and a significant victory for MNF in
achieving
a secure
environment in Basra.”206
373.
An expected
announcement of a US surge (initially of 9,000 troops) was
discussed
by the Iraq
Strategy Group on 5 January.207
The Group
observed that the contrast
between a
US surge and the UK plans for drawdown could be problematic, but
that
this could
be mitigated by explaining that Basra and Baghdad were in different
places
204
Minute
Siddiq to Sawers, 3 January 2007, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s
telephone conversation with the US
Secretary
of State, 3 January 2007’.
205
Minutes, 4
January 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
206
Report
Shirreff, 4 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 04
January 2007’.
207
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 5 January 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 5 January’.
70