The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
79.
Its Key
Judgements included:
“I. The
number of attacks against the Multinational Force and Iraqi targets
has
now matched
the previous highest level in April. There is no sign of an
early
improvement.
II. The
confrontation in Najaf has become a test of credibility for Allawi
and the IIG.
Allawi will
have to tread a fine line between acting before the conditions for
success
are right
and delaying too long and appearing weak, unless al-Sadr backs
down.
Iraqi
forces will be heavily reliant on broader US military
support.”
80.
The CIG judged
that even if a negotiated settlement was agreed, a residual
Shia
insurgency
would probably persist, and that:
“The Shia
violence has tended to obscure the fact that attacks in Sunni areas
have
also
continued unabated. Large areas in a number of Sunni cities remain
under
insurgent
control. This will continue to be the most serious long-term
security
problem for
the IIG.”
81.
The CIG
recorded that a British journalist, Mr James Brandon, had been
kidnapped
by JAM in
Basra. Mr Brandon was released shortly afterwards, but
kidnappings
continued.
82.
The CIG
assessed that the “mixed performance” of the ISF had been
highlighted
in Shia
areas. In Basra the police chief was reported to be “in league with
the militants
and
elements of the Iraqi police were involved in the kidnapping of the
British journalist”.
In al-Amara
the police chief had agreed not to interfere in JAM activities
because of
“police
concern about their own vulnerability rather than support for
al-Sadr”.
83.
On 19 August,
Maj Gen Rollo reported:
“There has
been a significant mood change over the past week and a
marked
deterioration
in the security situation in the South East … In the week up to
August
15, the
number of hostile incidents aimed specifically against
multi-national forces
in this
area showed an increase of 300 percent over the previous peak in
April 2004.
These
attacks have become more sophisticated and more
lethal.” 40
84.
Maj Gen Rollo
attributed the rise in attacks to “tensions and confrontation” in
Najaf,
and
commented that:
“A pause or
reduced tension in Najaf will have immediate and positive effects
in the
South.
However, it will not solve the problem here. There will remain an
irreducible
number of
militant sympathisers who will wish to attack and intimidate. I
intend to
tighten the
screw on the militants and exploit every opportunity to re-occupy
ground
in Basra
and elsewhere by resuming the visible patrolling that we had
reduced
in number
and intensity on transfer of authority at the end of June … There
is no
40
Minute GOC
MND(SE) to CJO, 19 August 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Iraq update – 19
August 2004’.
408