The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Estimates
of the total strength of the Fedayeen varied from
“15–40,000
members”.
•
The
irregular forces were motivated by a range of factors and they were
difficult
to
identify. They did “not need to be particularly militarily
effective to cause the
Coalition
problems politically or to increase Coalition requirements for
force
protection”.
•
The
“survival of communications links with Baghdad and the central
Iraqi
leadership”
was “of pivotal importance to the continued resistance by
the
irregular
forces”; “maintaining the implicit threat of retribution against
those
who do
not fight and undermining any perception of Coalition
success”.
356.
Mr Scarlett
concluded:
“… it
remains possible that even without effective command and control …
some
irregulars
would fight on …
“Although
there is little specific intelligence, we must be ready for new
guerrilla‑style
activity
and tactics … It is possible that Iraq now will have established
plans for
a
‘stay-behind’ network of fighters and supplies to harass Coalition
Forces and
the
population in areas supposedly cleared of fighters … The irregulars
will also
continue to
take advantage of any opportunity to infiltrate across the front
line into
the
Coalition rear areas.
“But the
key issue will be to what extent the irregulars can intimidate, or
are
supported
by the local population. Only a substantial, active and visible
Coalition
troop
presence can guarantee true control …”
357.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on 3 April that the mood swing in
the
media
between 1 and 2 April was like “night and day”.192
On 1 April
there had been
blanket
coverage of the alleged shortcomings of the military campaign and
criticisms
from
military officers in the Pentagon and the Gulf, which reflected the
genuine
concerns of
some military officers about the inadequacy of current force levels
in Iraq
and
frustration with Secretary Rumsfeld’s style and policies. Some
officers believed
that
Secretary Rumsfeld had deliberately argued for lower forces to show
the power
of a
transformed US military. There were also reports, attributed to UK
officers,
criticising
US tactics. The following day the media were all reporting the new
Coalition
offensive
towards Baghdad, the rescue of a US prisoner of war and the release
of three
journalists.
358.
Adm Boyce
reported to the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 3 April that the mood
in
Basra was
turning to the Coalition’s advantage.193
Overall,
the terror regime was being
weakened
but Iraqi execution squads were still active. In discussion, the
point was
192
Telegram
437 Washington to FCO, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Update, 1-2
April’.
193
Minutes, 3
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
60