The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
378.
The UK
objective described in the paper was “a stable, democratic Iraq at
peace
with itself
and its neighbours”.
379.
In a note to
his No.10 staff dated 12 December, Mr Blair commented that
the
situation
in Iraq was “worrying”.200
Iraqiisation
was not yielding the looked-for progress;
the
insurgent attacks were continuing far beyond what was manageable;
there was
a risk that
insufficient Sunni Arabs would participate in the election; life in
Basra had
not sufficiently
improved; and reconstruction remained a problem.
380.
Mr Blair’s
conclusion was that:
“… this may
be lower down the media profile; but it is not getting sorted. We
need
to sit down
with the US in the New Year and work out a proper strategy based
on
a hard-headed
reality check. The paper I have seen for 2005 is
inadequate.”
381.
The Inquiry
assumes that the paper referred to is the one sent by Mr Straw’s
office
on 9
December, and asked Sir Nigel Sheinwald what it was about the paper
that the
Prime
Minister had considered inadequate.201
382.
Sir Nigel said
that Mr Blair’s:
“…
consistent worry during this period was: … was our government
applying a
sufficient
level of effort to this problem? Were we doing everything that we
could with
the
Americans to get things moving? He continually looked for … the
missing pieces
in the
strategy. Were there game changers? Were there drivers which would
help us
on to more
profitable and successful terrain?”
383.
In a paper for
the Chiefs of Staff to consider out of committee dated 13
December,
Lt Gen Fry
looked at the possible roles for the MNF-I in the run up to the
election.202
They included:
•
Containing
insurgent activity. This had “returned to pre-Ramadan levels”
and
could be
expected to rise again in the run-up to elections. The US had
decided
to deploy
an additional three brigades to strengthen the MNF-I. “But a
balance
will be
needed between directly countering the insurgency and safeguarding
the
elections …
For example … activity may have to be tempered to avoid
further
Sunni
alienation.”
•
Countering
voter intimidation. Flyers had appeared in some areas
warning:
“You Vote,
You Die.” This type of activity was expected to rise as elections
grew
closer.
“ISF will need to counter this, but they lack capability. This
poses us a
dilemma:
increase direct MNF-I support to elections, thereby reducing
their
legitimacy;
or let the ISF lead and potentially accept a low voter
turnout.”
200
Note Blair,
12 December 2004, ‘Iraq’.
201
Private
hearing, 3 September 2010, page 65.
202
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS, 13 December 2004, ‘Iraq – Towards Successful
Elections’.
456