The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
13.
The points in
the speaking note also included:
•
A
description of “five key areas and one key test in each area, for
Saddam
to meet by
17 March”, which had been “picked out” from the draft
“clusters”
document
produced by UNMOVIC.4
•
If Saddam
Hussein “had any intention of complying, he would be able to
do
these. If
he were to do all of them, it would show that he has had a change
of
heart,
though even then it would not add up to full
disarmament.”
•
The tests
were designed to be “as straightforward and concrete as
possible”.
•
The “onus”
was “on Saddam to prove his innocence, not on us to
prove
his guilt”.
14.
It was clear
in Mr Blair’s discussion with President Lagos on 8 March that
Chile did
not support
the approach in the draft resolution.5
15.
Mr Blair
stated that he had worked out five specific tests. He would send
them
to
President Lagos, who agreed to discuss the proposals with
Mr Vicente Fox, the
Mexican President.
16.
Mr Blair
told President Lagos that China would not veto the resolution but
France
would; and
that he had not given up on persuading Russia to abstain. A
“further reason
to want a
second resolution, with a gap before the start of military action,
was to give the
Arabs a
chance to press Saddam to go into exile”.
17.
Sir David
Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the
Cabinet Office
Overseas
and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), subsequently wrote to President
Lagos
18.
The first test
would be to insist on interviews outside Iraq as specified in
resolution
1441. The
remaining four tests were “based on” the UNMOVIC “clusters”
document and
would
require Saddam Hussein “to provide either the material that is
unaccounted for,
or to
produce full documentation proving its destruction” in respect
of:
•
chemical
weapons – “specifically VX”;
•
biological
weapons – “specifically anthrax”;
•
missiles –
“specifically SCUDS”; and
•
remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs) – “specifically their possible adaptation
to
deliver CW
[chemical weapons]”.
4
UNMOVIC
Working Document, 6 March 2003, Unresolved
Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed
Weapons
Programmes.
5
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Chilean President,
8 March’.
6
Letter
Manning to Lagos, 8 March 2003, [untitled].
404