6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
264.
Lt Gen Pigott
explained that current commitments in Afghanistan and
subsequent
recovery
and deployment times would “limit the UK’s ability to contribute
significantly to
any
offensive operations in the region until November at the
earliest”.
265.
If it was
“likely that the UK would wish to contribute” to US action “when
the call
came”,
there was a “need to consider what action” was needed “now to
reduce risks and
as far as
possible readiness times”.
266.
Mr Hoon
was asked to agree further work to refine contingency planning, to
be
submitted
in mid‑June; and was informed that “proper preparations” would
require wider
involvement
in the MOD and discreet approaches to industry.
267.
In a meeting
with Sir Kevin Tebbit, ACM Bagnall, Mr Webb,
Mr Bowen, and others,
on 27 May,
Mr Hoon agreed that the best approach would be to explain the
practical
constraints
the UK faced in assembling a useful force package to Secretary
Rumsfeld.132
268.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that he had thought the land option “quite a big
ask, given
our
extensive involvement in Afghanistan at the time”; “it was
undoubtedly the case” that
the UK
would be “taken more seriously if we were making a substantial
contribution”,
and that
that influence would extend to shaping the policy.133
269.
In
preparation for a visit to the UK by Secretary Rumsfeld on 5 June,
Mr Hoon
wrote to
Mr Blair on 31 May.
270.
Mr Hoon
advised that he and Mr Straw had agreed a preliminary
objective
to guide
planning. Instead of calling directly for the elimination of Iraq’s
WMD
capability,
it called on Iraq to abide by its international obligations on
WMD.
The objective
did not explicitly mention regime change.
271.
UK
contingency planning had concluded that, for the UK to have
influence
on US
planning, a significant military contribution would be needed. That
was
defined as
at “division level” for land forces.
272.
To take
planning further, greater clarity on US thinking was
needed.
273.
Mr Hoon
also identified that exposing the constraints on the UK’s ability
to
contribute
forces before the end of 2002 could reduce its
influence.
274.
On 31 May, in
advance of a visit by Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr Hoon wrote to
Mr Blair,
stating
that there had been “no take up” of the offer “to help the US in
its planning”, and
setting out
the “preliminary conclusions” from the MOD’s contingency
planning.134
132
Minute
Watkins to MA/DCDS(C), 28 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
133
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 19‑20.
134
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
215