The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1032.
Subsequently,
in the context of questioning about the later debate on
the
interpretation
of resolution 1441 and the need for a second resolution, Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
stated:
“If I had
known that there was that degree of doubt in London, I would have
had to
examine
whether the advice I was getting from my own legal adviser was the
advice
I should be
listening to.”387
1033.
The Inquiry
drew those extracts from Sir Jeremy’s evidence, which addressed
the
understanding
in New York of the legal effect of resolution 1441 after its
adoption and
which had
not at that stage been published, to the attention of
Mr Macleod before he
gave
evidence to the Inquiry.
1034.
Addressing his
advice to Sir Jeremy in his statement, Mr Macleod
wrote:
“Sir Jeremy
Greenstock knew the legal framework as well as I did … I think
we
had a
shared understanding of what London’s instructions required and a
shared
assessment
of what the final text meant. I did not have to offer lengthy
written
advice: my
views were simply fed into the negotiating process, along with
those of
the rest of
the team. At no time during the negotiation of UNSCR … was there
any
opposition
or questioning of the views I expressed, and nor was I put under
any
pressure to
advise in any particular direction (by Sir Jeremy or anyone
else).”388
1035.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that he was “not really clear about what
exactly
happened in
London during the negotiation of resolution 1441”.389
He
understood from
papers that
he had seen “that questions were being asked of the Attorney on a
couple
of occasions”
but he did not “think that was evident to us at the time in New
York”.
1036.
Mr Macleod
added that “there seemed to be no definitive view from the
Attorney’s
Office
during the 1441 process”; which he thought had been “a big mistake”
and which
he
contrasted with the process adopted during the negotiations in 1997
and 1998.390
1037.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that UKMIS “had one view of the resolution,
we
thought it
would authorise the use of force”. He thought difficulties “could
have been
avoided” if
Lord Goldsmith’s view “had been obtained at that earlier
stage”.391
1038.
Referring to
the “doubts in London that began to emerge and really
became
apparent to
us in November”, Mr Macleod stated that it was:
“… puzzling
… that people decided just to continue allowing UKMIS to negotiate
a
text which
was, to use the phrase, ‘unfit for purpose’ because … a key
criterion for
387
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 26.
388
Statement,
24 June 2010, paragraph 22.
389
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, page 12.
390
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, pages 12‑13.
391
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, page 16.
380