The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
170.
Mr Straw
sent Mr Blair an FCO paper on Phase IV issues in advance of
Camp
David.99
Mr Straw
said that he hoped Mr Blair would counter any tendency by
President
Bush to
conclude that the UN had failed over Iraq:
“… the US
will need to go on working through the UN, both to authorise the
post-
conflict
work in Iraq so that a wide range of countries can join the
peacekeeping and
reconstruction
effort, and to provide an exit strategy for the US/UK and because
the
UN itself
and its agencies have important expertise to offer.”
171.
The FCO paper
on Phase IV issues stated that, in addition to US agreement on
a
UN
resolution, the UK needed US agreement on a number of other
important political,
humanitarian
and economic issues, including:
•
A Baghdad
Conference. The US was still thinking of a Coalition conference
with
the UN in a
supporting role. That was the wrong way round for
international
acceptability.
•
The role of
the Interim Iraqi Administration (IIA). An early statement of
intent to
hand over
power to an IIA while helping the Iraqi people to build a
democratic
future
“should go down well”. The UN Special Co-ordinator should have
veto
power over
the IIA’s decisions.
•
Humanitarian
issues. UK and US efforts were substantial: “we should play
them
up in the
media”.
•
Economic
issues. After several wars and 12 years of sanctions, Iraq’s
oil
revenues
alone would not meet the “very heavy” cost of
reconstruction,
particularly
in the short term. “We need to share the burden with other
developed
countries …
But contacts with them tell us they will make their
contribution
conditional on
there being an authorising UNSC resolution for Phase
IV.”
The World
Bank would need to prepare a rigorous needs assessment, but
that
too would
probably need UN cover.100
172.
On the UK’s
bilateral effort, the paper stated that Ms Short was considering
where
the UK
might help with the longer-term contribution to “reform and
reconstruction”.
SSR and
reform of the public service were two areas where the UK had a
comparative
advantage.
UK public finances were “tight”. If the UK was to keep armed forces
in Iraq,
“the scope
for a major effort on reform and reconstruction will be
limited”.
173.
Mr Blair
and President Bush met at Camp David on 26 and 27
March.
Their
discussions are addressed in more detail in Section
9.1.
174.
At dinner on
the first evening, Mr Blair told President Bush that he did
not want
his visit
to Camp David to focus primarily on a UN resolution to deal with
post-conflict
99
Minute
Straw to Blair, 25 March 2003, ‘Camp David: Post-Iraq
Policies’.
100
Paper FCO,
25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Issues’.
32