The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
395.
Mr Blair
concluded the meeting by saying that the military success in Basra
was
significant
and he was counting on an information campaign by the military to
persuade
the
irregulars who were still fighting to desist. The Iraqi regime was
finished and the
irregulars
should be taken into custody by the British, not lynched by fellow
Iraqis.
396.
Mr Hoon
told the House of Commons on 7 April that:
“Since my
last statement on 3 April, Coalition Forces have continued to
make
excellent
progress. Following a series of raids and patrols into the centre
of the
city,
British forces have now deployed in force into Basra. United States
Army and
Marine
Corps units have with remarkable speed advanced on Baghdad, seized
the
international
airport and conducted patrols into the city centre …
“We have
consistently encouraged members of the Iraqi armed forces to end
their
increasingly
futile resistance and return to their homes and families. We are
now
beginning
to see indications that these messages are having an impact, at
least
on some
Iraqi soldiers. That does not mean, however, that the regime’s
resistance
is
necessarily at an end. In Basra, Baghdad and other urban areas,
Coalition
Forces will
face a difficult and dangerous period dealing with the remnants
of
397.
The COBR
evening round-up on 7 April described resistance in Basra as
less
398.
While no area
was safe enough to call in humanitarian assistance, power and
food
were
available to the majority of the population and the slight
shortages of water were
399.
On 8 April,
Mr Scarlett informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq, which was
chaired by
Mr Prescott,
that the pattern of declining resistance in the South was not
uniform; and
that there
was no definitive information about the find by Coalition Forces of
material
which could
be chemical and biological warfare agents.243
400.
Adm Boyce
stated that, following the UK Division’s assumption of
control
over Basra,
the emphasis would switch from fighting to the post-conflict
phase.
The Commander
would be organising a meeting with local leaders the
following
day to
re‑establish normality in the town and to arrange the provision of
food and
water.
The Southern Regional Director of the US-led Office of
Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Affairs would move to Umm Qasr that day.
240
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 April
2003, column 21.
241
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 7 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
COBR Round Up of Key
Events – 7
April’.
242
Briefing
[MOD], 7 April 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep, 7 April
2003’.
243
Minutes, 8
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
70