The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

231.  In his post‑tour report on 13 July, Maj Gen Stewart wrote:

“The early decision to deploy Snatch and ECM has saved lives.”115

232.  The first IED attack in Iraq using an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) took place

against a UK Warrior vehicle in al‑Amara in May 2004.116

233.  On 1 July, Brigadier William Moore, Director Directorate of Equipment Capability

(Ground Manoeuvre) (DEC(GM)), advised PJHQ on the performance of the UK’s AFVs

against recent attacks.117

234.  Brig Moore wrote that initial assessments suggested that insurgent capabilities,

including EFPs, were capable in some circumstances of overmatching armour fitted to

Challenger 2 and Warrior vehicles, but they were not “at any significant risk from EFP”.

235.  Work to identify potential enhancements had begun, although “no platform

enhancement measure” in response to EFPs could be considered until an example of

the specific threat weapon had been examined. He also proposed a review of TTPs.

Brig Moore emphasised the importance of PJHQ highlighting any new anti‑armour

weapons found in theatre and full reports of past and future incidents to inform further

work on armour protection.

236.  Brig Moore provided guidance for commanders in Iraq which stated that

commanders and AFV crews should “remain aware of the finite limitations of armour”.

237.  Lieutenant General Sir William Rollo, GOC MND(SE) from July 2004 to December

2004, told the Inquiry that things were “very quiet” when he took over as GOC MND(SE)

in July.118 He said that the Sadrist disturbances from April and May had “died away”.

Problems started arising again in August with the clash at Najaf which re‑ignited attacks

on the coalition, but by December Lt Gen Rollo thought “things were relatively on track”.

238.  Asked by the Inquiry whether there was any difficulty “moving around” at this time,

Lt Gen Rollo said that there was “a sufficient number of Warrior fighting vehicles” that

could be used when the situation “became very unpleasant”.119 He added:

“Outside of that, then we were back into Snatch Land Rovers, which at that stage,

while … they could clearly be damaged by IEDs, they were remarkably tough

against the threat at that time.”

115  Report, 13 July 2004, ‘HQ MND(SE) Post Operation Report Operation TELIC 3/4 – 28 December 2003

– 13 July 2004’.

116  Report DIS, 19 August 2004, ‘Further Evidence of Lebanese Hizballah produced weapons in Iraq’.

117  Minute Moore to PJHQ, 1 July 2004, ‘Force Protection: Information Relating to the Performance of UK

Armour in Iraq’.

118  Public hearing, 15 December 2009, page 5.

119  Public hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 15‑16.

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