The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
725.
By May 2005,
the UK had been supporting an operation of at least medium
scale
in Iraq for
more than two years. The Ministerial Committee on Defence and
Overseas
Policy
Sub-Committee on Iraq (DOP(I)) recognised that future force levels
in Iraq would
need to be
considered in the context of the requirement to achieve “strategic
balance”
with
commitments in Afghanistan, to ensure that both were properly
resourced.
726.
In July 2005,
DOP agreed proposals for both the transfer of the four
provinces
in MND(SE)
to Iraqi control and for the deployment of the UK Provincial
Reconstruction
Team then
based in northern Afghanistan to Helmand province in the South,
along with
an infantry
battlegroup and full helicopter support – around 2,500
personnel.
727.
As described
under the heading ‘Iraqiisation’ below, the proposals to
transfer
responsibility
for security in the four provinces of MND(SE) to Iraqi control were
based
on
high‑risk assumptions about the capability of the Iraqi Security
Forces to take the
lead for
security. If those assumptions proved to be inaccurate and the UK
was unable to
withdraw,
agreement to the Helmand deployment in Afghanistan effectively
constrained
the UK’s
ability to respond by increasing troop levels in Iraq.
728.
In January
2006, Cabinet approved the decision to deploy to Helmand.
Dr Reid,
the Defence
Secretary, announced that the UK was “preparing for a deployment
to
southern
Afghanistan” which included a Provincial Reconstruction Team as
“part of
a larger,
more than 3,300‑strong British force providing the security
framework”.253
729.
The impact of
that decision was summarised neatly by Gen Walker
as:
“Militarily,
the UK force structure is already stretched and, with two
concurrent
medium
scale operations in prospect, will soon become exceptionally so
in
730.
Niche
capabilities such as helicopter support and Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target
Acquisition
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) were essential to the successful
conduct
of operations.
731.
From July 2005
onwards, decisions in relation to resources for
Iraq were
effectively made
under the influence of the demands of the UK effort
in Afghanistan.
Although Iraq
remained the stated UK main effort, the Government no longer
had the
option of
a substantial reinforcement of its forces there, should it have
considered one
necessary. When
the US announced in January 2007 that it would send a surge
of
resources
to Iraq, the UK was consequently unable to contemplate a parallel
surge
of its own.
732.
The impact of
the decision to deploy to Helmand on the availability of
key
equipment
capabilities for Iraq, and on the level of stretch felt by military
personnel,
is addressed
in Sections 14 and 16.
253
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26 January
2006, columns 1529‑1533.
254
Letter
Walker to Richards, 24 January 2006, [untitled].
100