9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
Private
Office. This time, the discussion would have the specific objective
of agreeing a
temporary
cease-fire in part of Anbar province in the hope that this would
help separate
Sunni
nationalists from foreign jihadists and act as a model for similar
developments
elsewhere
in Iraq. It would be for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG)
and the
Multi‑National
Force (MNF) to decide whether any demands made in return for such
a
cease-fire
could be met.
8.
On 6 June, Sir
Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, sent a
Note from
Mr Blair
to President Bush via Mr Stephen Hadley, the US National
Security Advisor.3
9.
The Note,
which covered a wide range of countries and issues, was a
reflection on
“a huge
opportunity … to leave a clear and morally powerful agenda in place
when we go”.
10.
On Iraq,
Mr Blair wrote that:
“Iraq has
been tough and we all know now the reserves of political and
military
strength
required for any military action. The international community
should be
united
behind us, urging us on, but they’re not.”
11.
A brief for
the visit by Mr Antony Phillipson, Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary for Foreign
Affairs,
suggested that the key point on Iraq was the need for the US to
remain active
and engaged
in the detail, after a non-interventionist period between the
election and the
formation
of the ITG “during which we lost valuable
momentum”.4
12.
In practice,
that meant the US and UK should press the ITG to deliver
Sunni
outreach
(including sensitive handling of de-Ba’athification and a media
strategy for the
Sunni
community) and be active in reaching out to Sunnis
themselves.
13.
On 7 June,
Mr Blair and President Bush held talks on a range of foreign
policy
issues in
the White House.5
14.
In the
discussion on Iraq, Mr Blair said that a stable, secure and
democratic Iraq
would have
a “transforming effect” on Iran and Syria. But the increasing
tension between
Sunni and
Shia needed to be watched. He judged that:
“Ultimately,
without an improvement in security, little progress could be
made.”
15.
Mr Blair
commented that the Iraqiisation process was “going OK”.
Mr Blair and
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald indicated that the UK hoped to start reducing troops in
the next
12 months,
and to make a more significant reduction in Multi-National Division
(South
East)
(MND(SE)) in the first half of 2006. It was important to stick to
the political
timetable,
as providing security for the next round of elections was a
constraint
on withdrawals.
3
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 6 June 2005, [untitled] attaching Note [Blair]
to Bush, [undated], ‘Note to
President
Bush’.
4
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 3 June 2005, ‘Visit to Washington, 7
June’.
5
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 7 June 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s talks with
President Bush, 7 June’.
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