9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
416.
In a report to
Mr Blair of his visit, Mr Straw described:
“Qualified
optimism that Sunni participation in the elections may be
sustained
through to
the formation of a new government. But the situation requires
active
management.
The default setting of the Sunnis is angry resentment at
their
dispossession.
A key danger period will be following the results (late
December).
The
Constitution allows for three months (90 days) to form a
government; in certain
circumstances
four months.”192
417.
On 13
November, members of the US military visited a Ministry of the
Interior
(MOI)
controlled detention facility in Baghdad, known as the Jadiriyah
bunker, to
facilitate
the release of a detainee.193 Upon
entering the facility they discovered around
170
detainees in an emaciated state. Instruments of torture, including
belts, rubber
hoses,
electrical cable and truncheons were recovered and there was
evidence of links
to the Badr
Corps militia.
418.
The discovery,
and the response of the Minister of the Interior, are described
in
more detail
in Section 12.1.
419.
In a speech at
the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 14 November, Mr Blair discussed
the
challenges
of globalisation, highlighting international terrorism as “the most
obvious”.194
He
said:
“What is
obvious now to all is that this [terrorism] is a global movement
and requires
global
action in response, of which the successful completion of a
democratic
process in
Afghanistan and Iraq is a major component.”
420.
A senior
government official specialising in the Middle East (1) wrote to
Mr Asquith
again on 14
November to inform him that lines of communication had been
established
to both
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr.195
He also
reported that
attempts
would be made to maintain and develop the link to
MAS1:
“My letter
to you of 3 October 2005 described [the] encounter with him …
[MAS1]
said he was
disenchanted with al-Sadr and considered him too close to the
Iranian
regime.
[MAS1] claimed to represent the Arab, Iraqi nationalist section of
the Sadrist
movement
…”
421.
The senior
official asked for Mr Asquith’s views on messages to be passed
through
the new
lines of communication to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Muqtada
al-Sadr and
suggested
that they should be tested before seeking to utilise them at short
notice “eg to
help reduce
any sudden increase in tension in MND(SE)”.
192
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 14 November 2005, ‘Iraq’.
193
Telegram
18170 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Detainees
Found in Bunker’.
194
National
Archive, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech 14
November 2005’.
195
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Asquith, 14 November 2005,
‘Lines to
the Shia’.
559