The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
same old
problems will re-emerge. Stick at it and we can show, eventually,
as in the
Balkans,
the unstable starts to become stable.”
617.
In the
concluding section of his speech, Mr Blair stated that an
integrated approach
was needed.
He was not suggesting that nothing should be done without
unanimity:
“That would
be a recipe for the lowest common denominator – a poor policy. I
am
arguing
that the values we believe in are worth fighting for … We shouldn’t
be shy
of giving
our actions not just the force of self-interest but moral
force.
“And in
reality, at a certain point these forces merge. When we defend our
countries
… we aren’t
just defending territory. We are defending what our nations believe
in:
freedom,
democracy, tolerance and respect towards others.
“… Fighting
for these values is a cause the world needs …
“But if
that’s what I and many others want … It means we don’t shirk
our
responsibility.
It means that when America is fighting for those values, then,
however
tough, we
fight with her. No grandstanding, no offering implausible but
impractical
advice from
the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard not the
easy
choices on
terrorism and WMD, or making peace in the Middle East, but
working
together,
side by side.
“That is
the only route I know to a stable world …
“If the
world makes the right choices now – at this time of destiny – we
will get there.
And Britain
will be at America’s side in doing it.”
618.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had written the speech “pretty much …
himself”.
He would
make it clear that the UK would “support” the US on Iraq “but also
make the
point about
UN inspectors effectively as an ultimatum”.234
619.
The references
in the speech to the UN and the use of the word
“justified”
in relation
to regime change were “strengthened” after the discussions
with
620.
Sir Michael
Jay commended the speech in a telegram to FCO posts on 7 April
and
invited
them to draw on it.236
621.
Mr Powell told
the Inquiry that Mr Blair’s College Station speech was not
intended
to develop
a new policy on Iraq; and that there was “no intention of changing
policy on
regime
change in Iraq”. He added that the comments on regime change were
in the
234
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
235
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
236
Telegram 73
FCO London to Madrid, 10 April 2002, ‘The Prime Minister’s Meeting
with President Bush,
5-7
April’.
500