The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
By July
2007, the UK contribution to the NATO training mission had reduced
to
18 personnel,
and was expected to decrease further to 14.577
The UK
provided personnel to the NATO training mission until its
withdrawal from Iraq on
31 December
2011.578
The
mission’s mandate was not extended, as agreement could
not
be reached
on the legal status of NATO troops operating in country. Over the
seven‑year
period, the
mission trained over 5,000 military personnel and over 10,000
police personnel
at a cost
of over €17.5m.
632.
On 18 August
2004, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blunkett about the importance
of
offering
training and mentoring to the IPS.579
He wrote
that the MOI lacked “the ability
to conduct
even rudimentary operational planning” which restricted both “their
ability to
plan and
execute police operations” and “the ability of the Iraqi police to
assume greater
responsibility
from the Multi‑National Force in Iraq”.
633.
The MOD
planned to run a training course “in September/October for
some
50‑60 senior
Iraqi police officers”. Nine UK military personnel would be
deployed to
work with
UK police officers in Iraq “to ensure that a coherent approach is
maintained”.
634.
Mr Hoon
wrote that the MOD’s experience suggested “that the benefits of
such
training
initiatives will fade quickly unless they are followed up with
longer‑term support
and
underpinned by mentoring”. He had asked officials in the MOD to
continue working
with
officials from the Home Office and the FCO to consider who should
provide this
support and
how.
635.
On 13
September, Mr Chaplin sought the FCO’s views about a “high
priority”
programme
of assistance to the MOI.580
He
described the MOI as:
“… highly
dysfunctional … and in need of significant assistance in a range of
areas,
from
operational planning to the basics like recording minutes of
meetings and
following
up action points.”
636.
Mr Chaplin
reported that, while the UK and US had resources allocated
to
operational
advice and supporting the IPS’s development, nothing
“adequately
addresses
the need for capacity‑building” within the MOI. A meeting with the
MOD, DFID
and UK
Police Advisers had concluded that a programme of assistance was
needed to
address
this gap, and that the GCPP “would be the most appropriate source”
of funding.
The key
elements of the programme were:
•
operational
planning;
•
basic
capacity‑building – “getting effective structures and working
practices
in place”;
577
Report MOD,
5 July 2007, ‘PJHQ Manning Tables: MNSTC‑I, NTM‑I and
NaTT’.
578
NATO
website, ‘NATO in Iraq: the Evolution of NATO’s Training Effort in
Iraq’.
579
Letter Hoon
to Blunkett, 18 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Training and Mentoring Senior
Iraqi Police Officers’.
580
Telegram
203 Baghdad to London, 13 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Ideas for Further
Help to the Ministry
of Interior’.
194