The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Germany
stated that it made no sense to break off inspections, especially
when
the process
was delivering results. The only way forward was for UNMOVIC
and
the IAEA to
produce objective criteria.
•
Cameroon
stated that the threat of force had been a key element in the
progress
so far and
military forces could not be left in place indefinitely, but 17
March
might be
too soon.
•
Bulgaria
had been ready to support the previous draft and “was studying
the
latest
proposal positively”.
•
Syria said
there had to be a peaceful resolution of the issue and the
inspectors
should
produce a specific work programme.
•
Chile agreed
that the Council should work for a consensus; the
inspection
process
must be allowed to mature; and Iraq must comply immediately.
But
he
questioned how Saddam Hussein was to be judged. The real question
was
“whether
the threat posed by Iraq was such that there had to be an end
now
to inspections”.
•
The US
responded to Chile that the Council should judge Iraq on the
basis
of its experience.
Iraqi co-operation over the years was grudging at
best.
•
For the UK,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock said that, if Saddam Hussein
admitted
he had lied
about Iraq’s WMD over the years, “that would go a long way
to
convincing
us that he had had a real change of heart. If he came forward
with
the truth;
that would be respected. If he lied, he would be dealt
with.”
1160.
In response to
the points raised, Dr Blix stated that UNMOVIC worked
under
resolutions
1284 (1999) and 1441 (2002). The former asked for “a work programme
and
key
disarmament tasks”. UNMOVIC “did not yet know which of the many
issues … were
the key
remaining tasks”; it “aimed to submit a list to the Council in the
week beginning
19 [sic]
March”. The Council had asked UNMOVIC to “complete” the
“remaining”
disarmament
tasks. Resolution 1441:
“… imposed
a greater sense of urgency on the inspection and disarmament
process,
but he did
not think the Council’s resolutions necessarily led to the
conclusion that
UNMOVIC’s
activities should cease as soon as next week. The resolutions did
not
demand
‘immediate disarmament’ but ‘immediate co-operation’
…”
1161.
Dr Blix
was also reported to have stated:
•
Iraqi
co-operation “sometimes seemed grudging”, but “only if
UNMOVIC
found that
Iraq was concealing things could one say that there was a real
lack
of co‑operation”.
•
With the Al
Samoud missiles and UAVs, Iraq was “trying to push to
the
boundaries
of what was permissible”. On the former, Iraq had
arguably
“trespassed
over the border”; the resolution did not prohibit UAVs, but they
were
“on the
border of what was allowed”. UNMOVIC was “still
investigating”.
390