The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
weapons,
their use and their concealment … [D]oubts – and in some cases
serious
doubts –
have emerged about the reliability of intelligence from three
sources whose
intelligence
helped to underpin JIC Assessments and the Government’s dossier
of
613.
The withdrawal
of intelligence in July 2003 from the source of the reports issued
on
11 and 23
September 2002 is dealt with earlier in this Section.
614.
The Butler
Report stated that more than 80 percent of the human
intelligence
reports
“which had had a material influence on JIC Assessments on Iraqi
deception
and
concealment … came from two principal sources”; and that one of
those sources
produced
two-thirds of the reports.239
Because
both sources were “believed at the
time to be
reporting reliably”, there would have been “a tendency for the
intelligence
community
to assume that they were similarly reporting reliably on Iraqi
concealment
and
deception”.
615.
In a footnote,
the Butler Report drew attention to the fact that, during SIS
validation
of its
sources after the conflict, doubts had emerged about the
reliability of reporting from
the source
providing the smaller proportion of the reports.
616.
The Butler
Report stated that two sources had produced “some two-thirds of all
the
intelligence
reports” circulated in 2002. Those reports had “had a significant
influence on
intelligence
assessments on Iraqi use of chemical and biological
weapons”:
•
One of
those sources “reported accurately and authoritatively on some
key
issues”,
but on the “production and stocks of chemical and biological
weapons
and agents,
he could only report what he learned from others in his circle of
high
level
contacts in Baghdad”.
•
In 2002,
SIS issued a number of reports from the second source “quoting a
new
sub-source
on Iraqi chemical and biological programmes and intentions”.
SIS
considered
the second source “to be an established and reliable source”
whose
“intelligence
on other subjects had previously been corroborated”. SIS had
also
included a
caution about the sub-source’s links to Iraqi opposition
groups.240
617.
The Butler
Report stated that it had:
“… been
informed by SIS that the validity of the intelligence report on
which the
45-minute
claim was based has come into question. Post-war source validation
by
238
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
398.
239
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
355.
240
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
401-403.
396