3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
292.
Recent polls
had showed that public support for military action had “eased
since
mid‑September
to around 60 percent”. That dropped to “40 percent or less” if
there was
“no UN
approval or allied support”, but jumped:
“… into the
seventies if action is taken by an international force or with UN
backing.
Some 50
percent or fewer think that the Bush policy is well thought
through, has
been fully
explained, or sufficiently backed up by evidence, and people
want
Congress to
ask more questions. But while waiting to be convinced, people
continue
to endorse
Bush’s leadership, and trust him to get this right by huge margins
over
the
Democrats.”
293.
The joint
resolution was agreed by Congress, and signed by President
Bush
on 17 October.
294.
Mr Straw
described getting the inspectors into Iraq to tackle
WMD
disarmament
as his and Mr Blair’s “overriding objective”.
295.
France and
Russia’s position was that in the event of
non‑compliance
a “second”
decision of the Security Council would be required before the
use
of force
would be authorised. In the light of that, Mr Straw advised a
two stage
approach
would be needed for agreement on a first resolution establishing
a
tough
inspections regime and sending a strong signal of the Council’s
willingness
to use
force in the event of a clear Iraqi violation.
296.
The US and
UK might also have to make clear that only a serious
violation
would
trigger further Council action.
297.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that he should try to persuade
President
Bush to
adopt a two resolution approach.
298.
In a
conversation with Secretary Powell on 1 October, about whether to
table
OP10 as
currently drafted in the Security Council, Mr Straw told
Secretary Powell that
the
resolution which had argued against military action in any
circumstances, and
had been
tabled at the Labour Party Conference, had been defeated; but the
debate
“had
confirmed that the Government would be in serious difficulty if a
good new [UN]
resolution
was not agreed”.99
299.
When Sir David
Manning subsequently spoke to Dr Rice, they discussed
three
options for
amending OP10:
•
Leaving
open the possibility of coming back to the Security Council, but
not to
specify it,
and to tone down the language of “all necessary means” to
something
99
Telegram
510 FCO London to Washington, 1 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 1 October’.
253