The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
493.
On 26 January,
after reading the weekly updates on Iraq, Mr Blair
commented:
“We need to
get a serious plan for Basra with JAM and Iranians targeted
effectively.
We can’t
leave the city to them. Central to our plan to draw down is a
continuing
effective
anti‑JAM push.”263
494.
On 26 January,
a view was provided to Mr McDonald (with copies sent to
various
departments
including No. 10) about the situation on the ground in Basra and
the
military’s
approach.264
It
stated:
“By nearly
every measure, security in Basra has deteriorated in the past
year …
Only a
decline in sectarian murders in mid‑2006 was a heartening
indicator,
illustrating
the gulf between the sectarian position in relatively
homogeneous
Basra and
the much worse situation in mixed Baghdad. Most Basrawis live in
fear,
including
the civic leaders to whom we would look for the rebirth of
economic, social
and
political activity in the city. All are subject to intimidation by
Jaysh al‑Mahdi
(JAM) and
to a lesser extent, other militias … They do not feel that they can
look
to the CF
[coalition forces], Iraqi Police (IPS) or Army (IA) for protection
… [F]or all
the time,
money and effort poured into the Basra IPS, they are undermining,
not
guaranteeing
security …
“Over the
last year MND(SE) have pursued a strategy of intelligence‑led
strikes
on militia
members and their subsequent detention. This has had an effect
…
Op SINBAD
was predicated on the Iraq Government playing its part, both in
clearing
out the IPS
and in using its available wealth to provide economic alternatives
for the
poor
unemployed Shia who form JAM’s main recruiting pool.”
495.
The author
continued:
“The main
security threat to MND(SE) during the past year has continued to
be
JAM. That
threat has evolved … MND(SE) arrests have prompted the
formation
of more
secretive groupings, with a more professional mindset and
approach.
A number
of these receive support from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard
Corps –
Quds Force (IRGC‑QF) … JAM’s local ambition is not only to drive
UK
forces out
of Iraq but to derive the kudos of being seen to do this, in order
to
consolidate
and legitimise their aspiration to run the districts and slums of
the city,
dominate
local politics and infrastructure and assert a grip on some of
Iraq’s most
strategic
economic assets, savaging any who challenge their hegemony.
Now
it is UK
forces in the sights of these JAM elements … Once UK forces have
left
Southern
Iraq, and much will then depend on developments at a national
level,
JAM’s
targets may become SCIRI and Badr elements (the MNF presence is key
to
263
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 26 January 2007,
‘Iraq Update,
26
January’.
264
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East to
McDonald, 26 January 2007,
‘The Basrah
security situation’ .
92