10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
•
The UK failed
to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme
required
in Iraq.
•
Reconstruction
was the third pillar in a succession of UK strategies for
Iraq.
The
Government never resolved how reconstruction would support broader
UK
objectives.
•
Following the
resignation of Ms Clare Short, the International Development
Secretary,
and the
adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1483 in May 2003, DFID
assumed
leadership
of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq. DFID would subsequently
define,
within the
framework established by the Government, the scope and nature
of
that effort.
•
At key points,
DFID should have considered strategic questions about the
scale,
focus and
purpose of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq.
•
The US‑led
Coalition Provisional Authority excluded the UK from discussions on
oil
policy and
on disbursements from the Development Fund for Iraq.
•
Many of the
failures which affected pre‑invasion planning and preparation
persisted
throughout
the post‑conflict period. They included poor
inter‑departmental
co‑ordination,
inadequate civilian-military co‑operation and a failure to use
resources
coherently.
•
An unstable
and insecure environment made it increasingly difficult to make
progress
on
reconstruction. Although staff and contractors developed innovative
ways to
deliver
projects and manage risks, the constraints were never overcome.
Witnesses
to the
Inquiry identified some successes, in particular in building the
capacity of
central
Iraqi Government institutions and the provincial government in
Basra.
•
Lessons
learned through successive reviews of the UK approach to
post‑conflict
reconstruction
and stabilisation, in Iraq and elsewhere, were not applied in
Iraq.
4.
When military
operations against Iraq began on the night of 19/20 March 2003,
the
Government
had not:
•
made
contingency preparations for the deployment of more than a handful
of UK
civilians
to Iraq;
•
allocated
any funding for post‑conflict reconstruction;
•
drawn up
any plans to deliver essential services and reconstruction in the
South,
in line
with the UK’s likely obligations as an Occupying
Power;
•
established
mechanisms within Whitehall which could co‑ordinate and
drive
post‑conflict
reconstruction; or
•
allocated
responsibility to any department or unit for planning and
delivering the
UK’s
contribution to post‑conflict reconstruction.
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