The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“I knew the
President was no more interested than I was in an endless round
of
inspections
and deception in Iraq, and in the days that followed, I
recommended
inserting
into the resolution a requirement for Saddam to submit within
thirty days a
declaration
disclosing his WMD capacity and holdings.”137
438.
Mr Blair
told Mr Hoon that he had been alarmed by US expectations that
the
UK would
lead the northern axis and that there should be no visible
preparations
for a month
or so. But Mr Hoon was not sent a copy of Sir David
Manning’s record
of the
discussions at Camp David.
439.
Mr Blair
telephoned Mr Hoon on the evening of 8 September, to give
him a
read‑out of
his discussions with President Bush and Vice President Cheney, and
the
US position
on the UN route, in advance of Mr Hoon’s visit to the
US.138
440.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that:
“The Prime
Minister said that he had been alarmed that [President] Bush
had
understood
that the UK would be ‘leading the invasion’ from the North of
Iraq.
This
required very careful handling. Having received the military
advice, the Prime
Minister’s
view was that we could not offer Package 3 in the timescale
required and
given the
constraints of Operation Fresco. But we might be able to offer
Package 2,
plus some
further elements. There should be no visible preparations for a
month
or so.”
441.
Mr Hoon
was not sent a copy of the record of the discussion at Camp
David.
442.
Mr Hoon
told Secretary Rumsfeld on 11 September that the UK would not
want
to offer
more than it could deliver and was therefore expecting to offer
maritime and air
assets for
any military campaign.139
443.
President
Chirac’s concerns about the broader implications for
the
international
system of military action against Iraq without a Security
Council
decision,
including the impact on the international coalition to counter
terrorism,
were
published in the New York
Times on 9
September.
444.
President
Chirac supported the return of inspectors on the basis of
the
provisions
of resolution 1284. He made clear that consideration of the use of
force
should be
considered in a second resolution if Iraq refused to allow
inspections.
137
Cheney D
& Cheney L. In My Time:
A Personal and Political Memoir. Simon &
Schuster, 2011.
138
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Contribution’.
139
Letter
Williams to Manning, 13 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Donald
Rumsfeld:
11 September 2002’.
168