9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
541.
The
negotiating plan said that it should be borne in mind that the ISF
were not yet
in a fit
state to take on JAM. It considered that the UK wished to
avoid:
“•
A
resumption of the IDF/IED campaign that would send our policy in
southern
Iraq back
to the unhealthy state it was in last May/June.
•
Conflict
between JAM and the ISF in Basra, particularly if it reaches the
level
where it
demands our re-intervention”.
542.
The plan went
on to suggest that the UK’s position should be that:
•
the
increased tempo of demands had put “all in doubt”;
•
if the
negotiation process broke down and attacks resumed, the UK
would
reinforce a
“vigorous ISF campaign” against illegal activity by JAM and
releases
would
cease;
•
the release
of JAM1 should mark the formal end of “all hostilities” in Basra;
and
•
the
agreements needed to underpin the end of hostilities should be in
place by
mid-January.
543.
Those
agreements should be:
•
a
demonstration of intent – a period of 20 days in which there were
no kidnaps
or crimes
or attacks in Basra by JAM;
•
a public
declaration that JAM would subscribe to the rule of law and cease
all
military
operations against the MNF and the ISF in Basra province and that
OMS
will look
only to the political route;
•
a public
declaration that JAM would cease all attacks upon, or intimidation
of,
current and
former Iraqi employees and contractors of MNF;
•
the
delivery of all mortar tubes, rounds and rockets, illegally held in
Basra, to
MNF or ISF;
and
•
a public
commitment to free and fair provincial elections in Basra
province.
544.
On 26 October,
government officials working closely with the military met
JAM1
once again
and put to him, as agreed by the RSG, that his own release should
not take
place until
the structures were in place to ensure that hostilities could not
break out
again. The
officials told JAM1 that some concrete proposals were being
prepared for
discussion.
JAM1 was reported to have reacted calmly. The officials
concluded:
“This went
better than we might have expected … This may simply because [sic]
we
did not, at
this stage, say: ‘you are not being released on 10 November’.
Equally he
did not
react poorly to our lines about agreements and declarations because
he had
yet to see
how draconian and, in their original form, unpalatable, they might
be.”
545.
At a
subsequent meeting with JAM1 on 30 October, government officials
working
closely
with the military put forward the list of agreements needed to
signal an end to
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